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NOTES
THE LITTLE TRAIN THAT COULDN'T:
DID THE PENNSYLVANIA ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTE
FAIL TO PROTECT CONRAIL FROM A HOSTILE SUITOR?
David N. Hecht*
"We are delighted to be merging with our ideal partner."
October 15, 1996, Conrail Chairman David LeVan, referring to
the proposed friendly merger with CSX.
"[W]e have succeeded in negotiating the best possible transaction
for all of Conrail's constituencies."
2
March 7, 1997, Conrail Chairman David LeVan, referring to
the split up of Conrail between friendly bidder CSX and hostile
bidder Norfolk Southern.
INTRODUCTION
Until 1997, Conrail Inc. 3 ("Conrail"), the Philadelphia-based parent
of Consolidated Rail Corporation, was the fifth largest railroad in the
United States.4 It operated the largest freight railroad in the North-
east quarter of the United States,5 controlled over 11,000 miles of
track, employed over 23,000 people, and generated annual revenues in
excess of $3 billion.6 CSX Corporation ("CSX"), headquartered in
Florida, was the third largest railroad in the United States.7 It oper-
ated rail services over 32,000 miles of track throughout the United
* I would like to dedicate this Note to Bertha Elkin and Beulah Hecht, my two
wonderful grandmothers, who have been a constant source of support and inspiration.
1. CSX and Conrail to Combine in Pro-Competitive, Strategic Merger, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
2. Conrail Shareholders to Receive $115 in Cash Per Share Under Amended CSX-
Conrail Merger Agreement, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 7, 1997, available in WESTLAW,
PRNEWS Database.
3. Conrail was formed by the United States government in 1976 through the
amalgamation of six bankrupt northeastern railroads. Shirley A. Lazo, Speaking of
Dividends, Barron's, July 26, 1993, at 42. In 1986, the government responded to a
hostile acquisition attempt by offering the stock to the public for S1.2 billion. Suzanne
Wooton, Railroads Nearing Accord on Takeover: CSX Would Purchase Conrail, Sell
Lines To Norfolk Southern, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 4, 1997, at IA.
4. Vincent F. Garrity, Jr. & Mark A. Morton, Would the CSXIConrail Erpress
Have Derailed in Delaware? A Comparitive Analysis of Lock-up Provisions Under
Delaware and Pennsylvania Law, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 677, 677-78 (1997).
5. Conrail Corporate Profile (visited April 14, 1997) <http'J/www.conrail.com
FMBCPROF.htmIl>. Conrail services Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia, the District of Columbia, and the Province of Quebec. Id.
6. Id. In addition, Conrail owned or leased approximately 2000 locomotives and
53,000 freight cars. Id.
7. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 4, at 677.
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States and Canada,' and generated annual revenues in excess of $10.5
billion.9 Norfolk Southern Corporation ("Norfolk"), headquartered
in Virginia, controlled over 25,000 miles of track throughout the
United States and Canada, 10 employed over 23,000 people, and gener-
ated annual revenues in excess of $4 billion."
When CSX and Conrail announced in October 1996 that they in-
tended to merge, the stakes were high. 2 Conrail was long considered
a potential takeover target by Norfolk.1 3 The saga originated when
David LeVan, CEO of Conrail, sought out CSX in October 1996 to act
as a preemptive "white knight.' 4 LeVan stated that "recent changes
in industry structure and in U.S. patterns of distribution require[d] a
broader market reach."'" He met with John Snow, CEO of CSX, and
suggested a friendly merger, while at the same time refusing to accom-
modate Norfolk.1
6
8. CSX Transportation Inc. Corporate Profile (visited April 14, 1997) <http:/
www.csxt.com/index.html>.
9. Charles Slack, Service Companies Had A Buying Spree; Acquisitions Near and
Far Boosted Local Businesses, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Apr. 13, 1997, at E9.
10. Norfolk Southern Corporate Profile (visited April 14, 1997) <http://
www.nscorp.con/nscorp/html/profile.html>.
11. Id. Norfolk also owned or leased over 2000 locomotives and 91,000 freight
cars. Id.
12. Associated Press, Conrail Holders Give CSX Loss in Takeover Fight With Nor-
folk, Investor's Bus. Daily, Jan. 20, 1997, at A8. Many observers concluded that
neither Norfolk nor CSX could afford to lose the battle for control of Conrail. See
Sharing the Wealth to End a Fight, Mergers & Acquisitions, May 15, 1997, at 5.
13. Steve Lipin, et. al., Norfolk Southern Bids $9.1 Billion for Conrail, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 24, 1996, at A3. As early as 1985, "the Reagan administration proposed that the
federal government sell Conrail to Norfolk Southern." Charles Slack, On A Collision
Course: CSX Picks Up Steam in Fight For Conrail, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 2,
1996, at D14. In 1994, Norfolk offered 1.1 Norfolk shares for each share of Conrail.
Id. This was rejected and in October 1995 LeVan and Goode met to discuss the possi-
bility of a Norfolk acquisition. Id. LeVan rejected the advances and began to fear a
potential hostile takeover situation. Id.
14. A "white knight" is the current Wall Street metaphor for an entity that is
sought out by a target company confronting a hostile bid, see infra note 19, to acquire
the company in place of the hostile bidder. William A. Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Business Organization and Finance 181 (6th ed. 1996). Although the target would
prefer to avoid any acquisition, the white knight is a more appealing acquirer, often
working in cooperation with current management. Id.
15. PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, supra note 1.
16. Daniel Machalaba & Anna W. Mathews, Railroading: For Conrail's Chief A
Deal With CSX Marks Bitter Setback, Wall St. J. Eur., Mar. 5, 1997, at 1. Although
Norfolk had discussed a possible merger with Conrail in the past, David Goode, Nor-
folk's President and Chief Executive Officer, only seemed willing to offer LeVan "an
appropriate position" as opposed to CEO or President. Id. Observers felt this ambig-
uous gesture created bad blood between the two. Id. Originally, in the planned
merger between Conrail and CSX, Snow was to retire within two years, allowing Le-
Van, the would-be chief operating officer, to succeed into Snow's post. Joseph Weber
& Christina Del Valle, What Might Derail the CSX-Conrail Merger, Bus. Wk., Oct. 28,
1996, at 50.
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As the deal unfolded, LeVan lost control of the merger process."
Despite resorting to Pennsylvania's anti-takeover laws,", he was un-
able to keep Norfolk out of the picture. Norfolk responded immedi-
ately to the proposed CSX-Conrail union by making a hostile bid for
Conrail.19 The victor was expected to create the third largest railroad
in the United States,' while the loser would be locked out of the East
Coast, where Conrail's operations are concentrated.2' Ironically,
only six months later, hostile bidder Norfolk and friendly bidder CSX
came to an agreement to effectively split up Conrail.' Shareholders
saw their holdings increase in value by 65%1 as a result of Conrail
management's inability to prevent its breakup by a hostile bidder.2 1
The proposed transaction, splitting up Conrail between Norfolk and
CSX, is currently awaiting approval from the Surface Transportation
Board (the "STB").25 It is likely that approval will be granted because
the STB helped negotiate the arrangement between the three railroad
companies.26
Despite the complexity of the merger agreement and bidding war
that followed, at the heart of the contest were two provisions of a
Pennsylvania law intended to thwart hostile takeovers. 27 Although
the Pennsylvania legislation, taken as a whole, has a single purpose, an
analysis of these provisions reveals that they often have conflicting
implications and represent inconsistent policies. In the context of the
Conrail merger, the ineffectiveness of the provisions resulted in a hos-
tile bidder ultimately acquiring partial control over a local company.
17. Machalaba & Mathews, supra note 16, at 1. LeVan had no intention of ulti-
mately ceding control of Conrail to Norfolk's Goode. Id.
18. Discussed infra Part II.
19. Conrail Advises Shareholders to Await Board Response to Norfolk Southern
Unsolicited Offer Before Taking Any Action, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 23, 1996, avail-
able in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database. A hostile bid is an offer opposed by incum-
bent management, generally made by a suitor, often characterized in the 1980s as a
"corporate raider," who seeks to acquire control of the company and oust incumbent
management. Neil Fabricant, Hostile Tender Offers: Can The States Shut Them
Down?, 22 J. Corp. L. 27, 29 (1996).
20. Conrail Holders Give CSX Loss in Takeover Fight With Norfolk. supra note
12, at A8.
21. Id.
22. Christopher Dinsmore, How Norfolk Southern Derailed the Merger of CSX
and Conrail, Virginian-Pilot & Ledger Star, March 5, 1997, at Dl.
23. Andrew Cassel, Antitakeover Law Enriched Conrail Shareholders, Phila. In-
quirer, Mar. 19, 1997, at C1. The final bid for Conrail was $115 per share, id.,
whereas, in September 1996 the stock price fluctuated around $70 per share. See
Standard & Poor's Stock Reports, Conrail, Jan. 13, 1997, at 608.
24. Daniel Machalaba, Conrail's Breakup Plan is Released by Norfolk Southern,
CSX Corp., Wall St. J., April 9, 1997, at B4.
25. Id; Don Phillips, Railroads Agree to Meet to Resolve Conrail Dispute, Vash.
Post, Jan. 21, 1997, at C1.
26. Phillips, supra note 25, at C1.
27. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1-I.B.6.
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This Note assesses the role the Pennsylvania anti-takeover provi-
sions played in the Conrail merger and argues that the Conrail merger
is an excellent example of (1) why complicated state anti-takeover
provisions are counter-productive and (2) why states that pass anti-
takeover legislation should not do so without considering the myriad
of possible applications. Part I examines the evolution of state anti-
takeover statutes and describe their application in situations where
hostile bidders attempt to acquire local companies through a variety
of methods. Part II analyzes Pennsylvania's unique legislative ap-
proach and its impact on the Conrail merger negotiations. Part III
first argues that the Conrail saga is an example of complex anti-take-
over statutes being counter-productive, and second, that hastily
passed anti-takeover legislation fails to account for corporate com-
plexity. This Note concludes that legislatures should consider four im-
portant factors when contemplating anti-takeover legislation, and that
a simpler approach more effectively accommodates the legislative in-
tent behind the provisions, while still protecting shareholder interest
in maximizing wealth.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTES
Part I discusses the development of federal regulation of securities
markets and the state legislation that was intended to supplement fed-
eral control. Part L.A discusses the federal and state regulation of se-
curities markets, particularly with respect to tender offers. Part I.B
then describes various types of state anti-takeover provisions and their
intended application.
A. State Response to Federal Regulation of Securities Markets
The federal government took an active role in corporate affairs with
Congressional passage of the Securities Act of 1933,28 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.29 Although this legislation was intended to
regulate, among other things, corporate ownership changes, cash
tender offers3" fell into a regulatory gap because they did not involve
the issuance of securities or the solicitation of proxies. Although
proxy contests were the primary means by which shareholders could
oust incumbent management in the 1950s and 1960s,31 cash tender of-
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1992).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1992).
30. "Tender offer" does not have a precise definition. See Lewis D. Solomon, et.
al., Corporations: Law & Policy 1065 (2d ed., West Publishing Co. 1988). It is most
commonly defined as a highly publicized offer to all shareholders to purchase their
shares at a premium above market. See id. There are, however, a variety of situations
with special circumstances that fall within the "tender offer" ambit. See id.
31. P.R. Chandy, et. al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth
Generation Anti-Takeover Law, 32 Am. Bus. L. J. 399, 403-04 (1995). A "proxy con-
test" provides shareholders a choice in the selection of directors, and ultimately in
management. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 1040. Shareholders receive proxy state-
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fers began to replace them in the 1960s.32 As a result of this inade-
quacy in the regulatory scheme, Congress passed the Williams Act in
1968."3 The Wiflliams Act was intended to protect investors con-
fronted with a cash tender offer by ensuring that they receive suffi-
cient and timely information with respect to the offer.' Regardless of
the new burdens that the Williams Act placed on bidders, the protec-
tion was less than management sought 35 and tender offers activity con-
tinued to escalate.36
Despite these efforts by the federal government to protect the in-
tegrity of the securities markets, many state legislatures felt Congress
failed to provide adequate refuge from hostile bidders and passed in-
creasingly aggressive anti-takeover statutes.3 7 In most instances, the
obvious intent of the state legislation was to protect incumbent man-
agement and to ensure that local companies which were potential
takeover candidates remained intact along with their significant pay-
rolls.38 The statutes were effective because they imposed additional
impediments to a takeover and, thus, inhibited or slowed any takeover
transaction.39 State legislatures were required to comply with the
Supreme Court's mandate that such legislation "avoid favoring either
management or the takeover bidder,"4 while still protecting corpora-
tions from foreign4' hostile bidders whose acquisitions were often fol-
ments and proxy voting forms from different slates of candidates; usually one is fa-
vored by incumbent management and the other is favored by challengers. See id. The
goal of a proxy contest is to win the voting support of the shareholders. See id.
32. Fabricant, supra note 19, at 30.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1992). The Williams Act added §§ 13(d),
13(e), and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Act of 1934 to control the tender offer process.
See Chandy, supra note 31, at 404.
34. Fabricant, supra note 19, at 30.
35. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967)).
36. Fabricant, supra note 19, at 30.
37. Anti-takeover statutes refer to legislation passed to protect management from
hostile takeovers. See Fabricant, supra note 19, at 30. For a breakdown of state legis-
lation in effect as of Aug. 1, 1992, see 3 State Takeover Statutes and Poison Pills:
Shark Repellents and Golden Parachutes, 8-14 (Robert H. Winter et. al. eds., Supp.
1992) [hereinafter "Poison Pills"]; see also Jeffrey L. Silberman, Note, How Do Penn-
sylvania Directors Spell Relief? Act 36, 17 Del. J. Corp. L 115, 121-28 (1992) (noting
the development of state anti-takeover provisions and the "generation" categories,
discussed infra at notes 44-57). Most state anti-takeover provisions were passed at the
behest of local corporate management, eager to thwart hostile takeovers. Fabricant,
supra note 19, at 32.
38. James D. Cox et. al., 3 Corporations §24.8, at 24.50 (1995).
39. Id.
40. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (White, J., plurality opinion);
see also S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 2-4 (1967) (discussing the role of cash tender offers in
corporate law and the importance of maintaining a level playing field between bidders
and target company management).
41. In this context, "foreign" refers to out-of-state bidders.
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lowed by costly liquidations.4" In reality, however, "most state anti-
takeover acts make no pretense of such even-handedness."43
State anti-takeover statutes have undergone extensive revision since
their inception.' The first generation of state legislation followed the
pattern of existing state securities laws, and "went beyond the disclo-
sure philosophy of the Williams Act by giving a state administrator
the power to review the merits of the tender offer's terms .... .45
These statutes often imposed waiting periods between the filing of the
tender offer and the date on which it was to become effective.46 In
1982, the Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,47 first reviewed
this type of statute. In MITE, the Court declared unconstitutional an
Illinois anti-takeover statute that imposed a waiting period and pro-
vided for a hearing on the tender offer's terms.48 The decision rested
on the Court's finding that the Illinois law violated the Commerce
Clause because it impermissibly burdened interstate commerce by at-
tempting to protect nonresident shareholders and by affecting out-of-
state transactions.49 Also, a plurality found that the law violated the
42. See infra notes 95-114 and accompanying text concerning the debate regarding
the motivation behind the anti-takeover legislation. Anti-takeover laws became pop-
ular during the merger and acquisition craze of the 1980s. See Patrick S. McGurn &
Mary F. Spatola, State Takeover Laws 1 (Investor Responsibility Research Center 2d
ed. 1995). Out-of-state bidders would finance a hostile tender offer by incurring tre-
mendous debt. Id. at 1-2. Once acquiring a controlling interest of the company, they
would begin a liquidation process to finance the interest payments and repay the
loans. Id. This transaction, known as a leveraged buy-out (LBO), became a favorite
technique of corporate raiders. Id.
43. Cox, supra note 38, § 24.8, at 24.50. This is in contrast to the Williams Act,
which may be viewed as "maintaining a level playing field between the bidder and the
target corporation's shareholders." Id.
44. State statutes have been challenged on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (holding that Indiana's con-
trol share acquisition statute was constitutionally permissible); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (holding that Illinois Business Takeover Act was unconstitu-
tional). As a result of these judicial decisions, states found acceptable parameters for
anti-takeover legislation. See Silberman, supra note 37, at 121-28. No state anti-take-
over law has been overturned or successfully contested since Edgar v. MITE. See
Steven Lipin & Anna W. Mathews, Conrail Fight May Hinge on Pennsylvania Law,
Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C1. In fact, recent decisions have upheld anti-takeover
statutes that prevented a bidder from any possibility of making a successful offer. See
e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989)
(upholding a Wisconsin business combination statute), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955
(1989).
45. Cox, supra note 38, at § 24.8, at 24.51-24.52; see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49:5-4a
(West Supp. 1994); see also Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (1981)
(holding that New Jersey takeover law frustrates the purpose of the Williams Act by
substituting bureau chief's view of the offer for the informed judgment of
shareholders).
46. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36b-44(a) (West 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 203(a)(1) (1983) (repealed); 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 74(a) (West 1994).
47. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
48. Id. at 646.
49. Id. at 643-46.
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Supremacy Clause because it conflicted with the Williams Act's im-
plicit requirement of evenhandedness.5"
Following MITE, states created "second generation" statutes which
purported to regulate only the internal affairs of domestic corpora-
tions.' These statutes took various forms, including "control share
acquisition" statutes, 2 "fair value" statutes,53 and other constituencies
statutes.54 In 1987, the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America 5 upheld an Indiana control share statute 5 6 thus
quelling any fears that similar second generation anti-takeover stat-
utes would be deemed unconstitutional.
After the United States Supreme Court opened the door with the
CTS decision, many states created a third generation of anti-takeover
statutes that were more aggressive than their predecessors. 7 Most of
these statutes were intended to delay any transaction that would com-
plete the second step of a two-step acquisition where the first step was
not agreed to by the target company's management.5 Pennsylvania
passed legislation in 19909 that is considered to have inaugurated the
fourth generation of anti-takeover provisions.'
B. State Statutes and Accompanying Provisions
Most states have generally incorporated one or more of six different
approaches to dealing with takeover situations: control share acquisi-
tion statutes, business combination statutes, fair price statutes, cash-
out statutes, other constituencies statutes, and disgorgement
61provisions.
1. Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Control share acquisition statutes62 require a person seeking to
purchase a certain controlling amount of target stock" to obtain
50. Id. at 630-34.
51. See Fabricant, supra note 19, at 33.
52. Discussed and defined infra at note 62.
53. Discussed and defined infra at note 83.
54. Discussed and defined infra at note 74.
55. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
56. Id.
57. Cox, supra note 38, § 24.8, at 24.58.
58. Id The business combination statute, see infra note 74, is an example of this
type of provision. Id.
59. See infra note 114.
60. Silberman, supra note 37, at 117.
61. Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 4-5.
62. Control share acquisition statutes have been adopted, in varying forms by
many states. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 15: see e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-
2721 (West 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0902 (West 1993); Ind. Code. Ann. §§ 23-1-42-
1 to -11 (Michie 1995).
63. The exact threshold at which control is deemed to be acquired is defined by
statute. For example, Indiana sets the threshold at 20%. Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-42-
1(1) (Michie 1995).
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shareholder approval of the proposed transaction in order to exercise
the voting power of the acquired stock.64 In most states with this type
of provision, the offeror may acquire the shares without shareholder
approval, but the acquired shares will be held without voting rights.65
Sometimes, shareholder approval is required for the acquisition re-
gardless of whether the shares are acquired with voting rights. 66 Ad-
ministering this type of provision requires the offeror to submit a
statement disclosing his intent to acquire the "control" block.67 This,
in turn, will prompt a special shareholder meeting to vote on the pro-
posal and give shareholders an opportunity to avail themselves of ap-
praisal rights68 in the event the proposal is approved. 69
The purpose of this type of provision is to give current shareholders
an opportunity to vote on a proposed acquisition of control.7" Like
much of the anti-takeover legislation, this is premised on the notion
that individual shareholders are often disadvantaged when confronted
with a tender offer.7' By permitting the shareholders to act together,
these provisions aim to eliminate the coercion presented in two-tier
front loaded offers72 by forcing the bidder to disclose its post-acquisi-
tion plans.73
64. See Poison Pills, note 37, at 4.
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id.
67. Martin Lipton & Erica H. Steinberger, 1 Takeovers & Freezeouts § 5.03[1], at
5-29 (1997). A control block is the exact threshold at which control is deemed to be
acquired, as defined by statute. See supra note 63.
68. The appraisal remedy permits shareholders to dissent from a transaction that
involves a fundamental corporate change-i.e., a merger-and insist on being paid in
cash the value of their shares as determined by appraisal. Solomon et al., supra note
30, at 957.
69. Lipton & Steinberger, supra note 67, § 5.03[1], at 5-30.
70. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 15.
71. Id. All tender offers, to some degree, pressure shareholders to accept
whatever premium is offered in the takeover bid. Id. at 15-16. If the target sharehold-
ers believe that a successful initial tender will be followed by a purchase of non-ten-
dered shares at a price lower than that offered in the initial bid, shareholders may
tender their shares even if they do not believe the offer to be in their best interests. Id.
72. A "two-tier" takeover bid generally involves a strategy where the bidder ten-
ders for 50%-or at least enough stock to take de facto control-at one price, but at
the outset it is clear that once it obtains control, it will merge out the remaining share-
holders at a lower price. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 14, at 184. Those who wait
for the "back end" will be worse off than those who tender into the early offer. Id.
Resistance to the tender offer is subdued because the two-tier offer creates a competi-
tion among shareholders for the "front end" offer. Id. Even if the shareholder is
dissatisfied with the front end, they fear being left with an even more dissatisfying
back end, and therefore, tender. Id.
73. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 16.
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2. Business Combination Statutes
Business combination statutes74 prevent a target's management
from engaging in any business combination" for a designated period
of time after a shareholder acquires a certain amount of the target's
outstanding shares.76 This type of provision is intended to thwart
highly-leveraged takeover bids referred to as "leveraged buy-outs,""
in which the target's assets are used as collateral for the offeror's debt
financing.78 Often, after the acquisition, the acquirer is forced to liq-
uidate assets of the now-acquired target in order to generate cash to
meet the interest payments generated by the debt.79 These acquisi-
tions typically involve some type of business combination soon after
the transaction.'
Most business combination provisions allow an offeror to make a
good faith plea to the board of directors to approve a post-acquisition
strategy.8' Also, most states use this provision in tandem with a fair
price provision, discussed below.'
3. Fair Price Statutes
Fair price statutes 83 require that the same price be paid to all share-
holders who tender their shares, regardless of whether they partici-
74. Currently, many states have adopted business combination statutes. Poison
Pills, supra note 37, at 27; see eg., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-2741 - 10-2743 (West
1996); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1131 - 14-2-1133 (1994); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-1-43-1 -
23-1-43-24 (Michie 1995).
75. Business combinations are broadly defined to include mergers, sales of assets,
liquidations, recapitalizations, and various kinds of self-dealing transactions. See Up-
ton, supra note 67, at 5-26. The statutes are intended to "delay any transaction that
would complete the second step of a two-step acquisition where the first step was not
agreed to by target company's management." Cox, supra note 38, at 24.58.
76. Poison Pills, supra note 25, at 4. These statutes are intended to prevent take-
over bids financed by high-yield debt, which often requires target assets to be sold to
repay offeror's debt and recoup profits. Id.
77. While an LBO can take many forms, it is essentially the -[acquisition of a
business in a transaction where the purchaser's equity risk is small in relation to the
purchase price and most of the purchase price is provided by borrowings from one or
more outside lenders." Harvey E. Benjamin & Michael B. Goldberg, Leveraged Ac-
quisitions & Buyouts 11 (1986); see supra note 42. In some transactions, part of the
debt is financed by the company itself, in the form of a deferred purchase price. Ben-
jamin & Goldberg, supra, at 11.
78. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 1062.
79. See Fabricant, supra note 19, at 30. The lenders look to the assets and/or cash
flow of the acquired business as the source of repayment of the loans, as opposed to
looking to the purchaser. Benjamin & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 11.
80. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 28.
81. Id at 28-29.
82. Id at 30.
83. Many states have adopted fair price statutes and, in addition, several have
business combination statutes which contain a fair price component. Id. at 42; see e.g.,
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 607.0901, 607.0903 (Vest 1993 & Supp. 1998); Ga. Code Ann.
§§ 14-2-1110 to 14-2-1113 (1994).
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pate in the first or second tier or a multi-tiered offer.' These
provisions are intended to protect minority shareholders from being
mistreated in the back-end stage of a two-tier acquisition.85 Their ef-
fect is limited to transactions in which a large shareholder seeks to
consolidate its control over the company, which will result in the mi-
nority shareholders being squeezed out-e.g., merger, sale, liquida-
tion,86 recapitalization,87 or minority buy-out.88 In these scenarios,
minority shareholders are often forced to accept a lesser price than
originally paid by the offeror for the control portion of the stock.8 9
Because minority shareholders know they will eventually be forced to
sell their stock if a majority tender into the original offer, they will be
induced to "take the money and run" and tender into the original of-
fer. The objective of this provision was to protect shareholders from
being coerced into tendering into this type of two-tiered bid by pro-
viding that every shareholder tendering into the offer will receive the
same compensation for their shares.90
4. Cash-Out Statutes
Cash-out statutes91 require that if an offeror purchases a certain
amount of stock, it must then offer to purchase the remaining shares
of all other stock at a price which reflects the highest premium' paid
84. Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 4.
85. Id. at 41. Shareholders are protected from being either coerced into tendering
into the front-end of the offer, or being forced to accept an inferior back-end amount.
See Klein & Coffee, supra note 14, at 183-86, 194.
86. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 419-20:
The liquidation of an enterprise is ... the reduction of its assets to cash or
some other "liquid" form. While it usually implies the cessation of a corpo-
ration's normal business operation, it does not necessarily involve dissolu-
tion; the corporation may remain a 'shell' whose sole function is to own the
now liquid assets.
87. See William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporations: Cases and Materi-
als 1268 (6th ed. 1988) ("A recapitalization is a material readjustment in the relative
rights, preferences, and privileges of a corporation's various classes of stock.").
88. Also known as a "freeze out," a minority buy out is a corporate transaction
that reconstitutes the corporation's ownership by involuntarily eliminating the equity
interest of minority shareholders. Id. at 1168. The dominant shareholder purchases
the shares of the minority holders, usually for cash or fixed income securities, where
the dominant shareholder has the votes to cause the transaction to occur. Solomon,
supra note 30, at 1061.
89. See supra note 72 & accompanying text.
90. Id.
91. This type of statute is only currently in force in Maine and Pennsylvania. See
Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 51; see e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, § 910 (West
Supp. 1997); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2541-2548 (West 1995).
92. This premium refers to the difference between the market price of the stock
and the tender offer which is generally higher than the market price. Solomon, supra
note 30, at 1052. This greater-than-market bid is, primarily, what encourages share-
holders to tender their shares. Id.
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by the offeror in accumulating his initial block of target stock.93 Cash-
out statutes, like the other provisions, are intended to permit share-
holders to dissent from a large stock acquisition that may confer con-
trol upon an acquirer.94 By guaranteeing the opportunity to cash out
at the fair value of their shares, shareholders are protected against the
coercive nature of tender offer schemes.95
Notice of a "control" acquisition that would activate the provision
must be given to the shareholders of record.96 After the notice, the
shareholder may make a written demand on the control group for
payment in cash for those shares.97 Cash-out statutes force the of-
feror, as opposed to the target company, to purchase the shares of
dissenting shareholders.98
5. Other Constituencies Statutes
Other constituencies statutes, 99 often referred to as "nonmonetary
factors statutes," permit directors to consider interests other than the
tender offer price in determining whether or not to accept a bid."°
This type of provision is intended to give corporate boards the leeway
to reject superior monetary bids if management believes that the bid-
der would not serve the best overall or long-term interests of the com-
pany.'0 This type of provision supports the notion that a corporation
is responsible not only to its shareholders, but to its relationships with
the community at large.'0 2 Often, corporate acquisitions and mergers
result in layoffs and plant closings which have a devastating effect on
local economies.' 03 By preventing the takeover, shareholders may be
93. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 4. For example, if a hostile bidder acquired
20% of a target company's stock, and the state statute defined 20% as the threshold
amount that activates the provision, the remaining 80% shareholders would be enti-
tled to sell their stock to the hostile bidder for the highest amount it paid for the
original 20%.
94. See Poison Pills, supra note 25, at 51.
95. Id. ("[T]he statutes are intended to limit the perceived coercive effect ... of
two-tier and partial tender offers and so-called 'creeping tender offers,' in which a
large block [of stock] is purchased on the open market, and to assure that all share-
holders will share in the control premium paid by the Offeror."); Chandy, supra note
31, at 411 (The statute was passed "in order to discourage two-tier, front-loaded
tender offers.").
96. Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 52.
97. Id.
98. Id
99. Other constituency statutes have been adopted by a large number of states.
See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 55. See eg., Iowa Code Ann. § 490.1108 (Vest
1991); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.12-210(4) (Michie Supp. 1996); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 156B, § 65 (Law Co-op Supp. 1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138 (Michie 1994);
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
100. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. The Conrail break up between
CSX and Norfolk provides a good example. The joint application submitted to the
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denied a profitable bid, but the negative impact on the community will
be avoided. Despite this provision, other constituencies statutes do
not place the community's interests above that of the shareholders.
Instead, these statutes are drafted so that shareholder interests are no
longer considered the primary concern, but are now one of many in-
terests the board must consider.'04
6. Disgorgement Provisions
Disgorgement provisions 0 5 permit corporations, under certain cir-
cumstances, to obtain "short-swing" profits10 6 from a shareholder that
were realized from the sale of stock after the company is put "in
play."' 0 This type of provision is a legislative effort to discourage
arbitrageurs 0 8 and speculators whose trading activites in the target
company's stock often forces a company into a hostile takeover situa-
tion.' 0 9 When a company has been put "in play," arbitrageurs' in-
creased buying of the target stock will bid up the price." 0 Before the
Surface Transportation Board covering the breakup forecasts severe job cuts in Phila-
delphia. See John George, No Surprise: Conrail Breakup Brings Job Cuts, Phila. Bus.
J., June 27, 1997, at 3. The break up will result in a net loss of 1623 mostly administra-
tive and clerical positions. Id. The real impact goes much further, however. For ex-
ample, when Gulf Corporation was acquired by Standard Oil Company of California,
people feared the economy would be negatively impacted in a variety of ways. See
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111, 121
(1987) (citing Thomas F. O'Boyle & Susan Carey, Gulfs Departing Pittsburgh Would
Deal a Harsh Blow to City's Economy and Pride, Wall St. J., March 9, 1984, at 33).
Donations to local charities were expected to decline, as was revenue from personal
and corporate property taxes. Id. Concerns even arose regarding loss of revenue from
local messenger services. Id.
104. The Delaware Supreme Court gave some judicial credence to this approach in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989); see
infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
105. Disgorgement provisions have been adopted by Ohio and Pennsylvania. See
Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 59. See e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.043 (Ander-
son 1992); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2571-2576 (West 1995).
106. Short swing profits are defined in the Pennsylvania statute as profit realized
upon the disposition-i.e., sale-of the corporation's equity securities if the disposi-
tion occurs within 18 months after the person or group became a controlling person or
group, and the equity securities were acquired within 24 months before or 18 months
after the person or group became a controlling person or group. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 2575 (West 1995); see Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 60.
107. Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 5. Pennsylvania was one of the first states to
introduce this type of provision in the 1990 legislation. Id.
108. Arbitrageurs, or "arbs," are professional risk-takers-often brokers who
purchase shares from the public at a price below the tender offer price, with the ex-
pectation that they will tender to the bidder at the higher price and make a profit on
the spread. Solomon, supra note 30, at 1058. The spread exists due to the risk that the
target company will prevent the consummation of the tender offer and send the price
back to its pre-tender offer level. Id. "The arbitrageur assumes the risk of failure of
the offer in return for the expected profit." Id.
109. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 59.
110. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 1058. The market assumes the company will be
acquired, if not by the bidder, then by another bidder, or the company will acquire all
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smoke settles, arbitrageurs will sell the stock, making a quick profit,
and leaving long-term shareholders to suffer the consequences. When
raiders put a company in play, they create a "death dance on that
corporation."' 1 ' The company often fights back by shutting down or
selling off assets." 2 Management's attention is drawn away from run-
ning the business as they cope with the looming crisis and the focus
shifts from long-term development to short-term results.'1 3
States have adopted various combinations of the above statutes.
Each works to thwart unwelcome takeovers of local companies and
ensure that shareholders are not unreasonably coerced into accepting
an inadequate offer for their shares.
II. CSX's BATTLE FOR NORFOLK IN PENNSYLVANIA FOR CONTROL
OF CONRAIL
Part II discusses Pennsylvania's adoption of the various anti-take-
over statutes discussed above. Part Il.A reviews the legislation with a
specific focus on the fair price provision and the other constituencies
provision. Part II.B assesses the provisions' impact on the Conrail
negotiations.
A. Pennsylvania's Anti-Takeover Statute
Pennsylvania passed an aggressive statute in 1990' 4 that involved
several of the above anti-takeover techniques.' 15 It has been observed
that "no prior state anti-takeover law [is] as broad or as protective,""' 6
or most of its own stock for debt securities or cash. Id. In either event, there is an
expectation that shareholders will be able to sell out at a large profit. Id.
111. Patty Tascarella, Pennsylvania's Anti-Takeover Law Was Intended to Derail
Greenmailers, Business Dateline, September 1990, Vol. 9; No. 1; Sec. 1; at 22 (quoting
Bill George, then legislative director of the United Steelworkers of America).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Act of April 27, 1990, No. 36, 1990 Pa. Laws 36 (codified at 15 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 102, 511-12, 1721, 2502, 2542, 2561-67, 2571-76, 2581-83, and 2585-88 (West
1995)). It is commonly referred to as a fourth generation statute. See Part I.A.;
Chandy, supra note 31, at 405 n.39.
115. Pennsylvania's anti-takeover statute includes the following:
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
Exercise of Powers Generally § 1715
(Other Constituency)
Approval of Transactions with Interested Shareholders § 2538
(Fair Price)
Control Transactions (Cash-Out) §§ 2541-2548
Business Combinations §§ 2551-2556
Control-Share Acquisitions §§ 2561-2567
Disgorgement §§ 2571-2576
Employment Related Provisions §§ 2581-2583. 2585-2588
See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 13.
116. Chandy, supra note 31, at 413. More than forty states have adopted some
form of anti-takeover statute. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and there was fierce criticism of the Act. 117 The statute did contain
opt out provisions118 for each section which allowed companies, under
certain circumstances, to avoid being bound by the legislation. 119
Many companies immediately opted out after passage of the Act. 12
Opponents charged that it would virtually strip shareholders of their
ability to challenge corporate management and would drive investors
away from Pennsylvania companies. 12  The Pennsylvania statute in-
volved more defensive mechanisms than the legislation of other states,
Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1425, 1439 (1991). For a discussion of the different types of anti-takeover
statutes that states have adopted, see id. at 1439-52; Richard A. Booth, The Promise
of State Takeover Statutes, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1635, 1670-81 (1988).
117. McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at Pennsylvania-6. The bill was also known
as "The Fat Cat Protection and Shareholder Rip-Off Act" because its provisions made
ousting poor management more difficult. See Tascarella, supra note 111, at 22.
118. Opt out provisions enable a company, by following specified procedures, to
choose not to be bound by particular anti-takeover provisions. Poison Pills, supra note
37, at 77.
119. See e.g., 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2561 (West 1995) (allowing a corporation to
opt out of the control share acquisition provision with a bylaw amendment adopted
by the board within 90 days after the date of passage-i.e., by July 26, 1990-or in the
original charter, or by charter amendment within 90 days after a company becomes
eligible for coverage); id. at § 2541 (allowing a corporation to opt out of the control
share cash out provision); id. at § 2551 (allowing a corporation to opt out of the busi-
ness combination provision); id. at § 2571 (allowing a corporation to opt out of the
disgorgement provisions).
Opt out provisions are common in state anti-takeover statutes. See Poison Pills,
supra note 37, at 77. Corporations were given a 90-day period following enactment of
the provisions to opt out of all or any of them by, among other measures, enacting a
bylaw amendment adopted by the board of directors. See e.g., 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 2571 (West 1995) (opt out procedures for disgorgement provision).
120. Although most Pennsylvania companies supported the legislation, many chose
to opt out after its passage. Michael W. Armstrong, At Least 67 Firms Buck Act 36,
Philadelphia Bus. J., July 30, 1990, at 1. It is difficult to assess the exact number of
companies that chose to opt out because there is no legal requirement for companies
to report their opt out to the state. Id. More than 65 of Pennsylvania's publicly traded
corporations (about 21%) chose to opt out of all or a part of this statute. Id.; see also
Vindu P. Goel, Many Top Pennsylvania Firms Opt Out of Provisions in State Anti-
Takeover Law, Wall St. J., July 27, 1990, at A3 (discussing the irony of companies first
supporting the legislation and then opting out); Justin P. Klein & Jeffrey P. Green-
baum, Companies Cool Toward Anti-Takeover Law, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 15
(discussing the many companies that chose to opt out of anti-takeover statutes).
121. Silberman, supra note 37, at 152-53 & n.236; McGurn & Spatola, supra note
42, at Pennsylvania-6. Four subsequent studies reported that the Pennsylvania take-
over law caused a significant decline in the prices of Pennsylvania stock. Id. at Penn-
sylvania-7. For example, Wilshire Associates released two studies of the law's impact
on April 23 1990 which reported that shareholders lost over $1 billion in the five
months following the introduction of the Pennsylvania legislation and predicted that
losses would be higher if the legislation was enacted and enforced. Id. at Penn-
sylvania-7-8. Wilshire incorporated 47 factors known to affect stock price to estimate
where Pennsylvania stock prices should have been during the relevant period. Id. at
Pennsylvania-8. "When stock prices deviated from the predicted price, Wilshire at-
tributed that movement to the Pennsylvania law." Id.
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and certain provisions moved many to declare it the most
aggressive. 122
In 1992, shareholders of Armstrong World Industries challenged the
Pennsylvania statute on constitutional grounds before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit."2 In Armstrong World Indust. Inc.
v. Adams, 24 the Third Circuit dismissed the action for failure to pres-
ent "a case or controversy."'12 The case was brought immediately af-
ter the statute took effect, and Judge Anthony Scirica held that none
of the statute's provisions had been triggered.1 26 No further actions
were brought and, in light of the Supreme Court's trend towards liber-
alizing state authority to implement anti-takeover provisions,127 it is
doubtful a court would find the provisions unconstitutional.
Only two of the Pennsylvania statute's provisions were relevant to
the Conrail negotiations.1 28 Each provision had a different legislative
objective, and both impacted the results of the bidding contest. The
two provisions at the center of the CSX/Norfolk conflict were the fair
price provision, and the other constituencies provision.
1. Fair Price Provision
Pennsylvania's fair price provision guarantees shareholders the
right to obtain, from a bidder acquiring more than 20% 129 of the vot-
ing securities of a registered Pennsylvania corporation, the highest
price the bidder paid for the shares wvithin the 90-day period ending
122. See Silberman, supra note 37, at 117; see also Klein & Greenbaum, supra note
120, at 15 (noting that Pennsylvania's legislation was the most aggressive); Leslie
Wayne, Takeovers Face New Obstacles, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at DI (discussing
the impact of Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover legislation).
123. Armstrong World Indus. Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding
that the controversy is not ripe).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 424. This affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
128. This paper will discuss the impact of the fair price provision and the other
constituencies provision on the Conrail merger. The statute, however, also contains
other anti-takeover provisions. See supra note 115 & accompanying text.
129. The 20% threshold is used to define a "controlling person." 15 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 2543(a) (West 1995). There are listed exceptions to the 20% threshold. Id. at
§ 2543(b)-(c). The corporation can opt out of this subchapter. Id. at § 2541. Further
exceptions attempt to exclude natural persons who do not appear to have acquired
stock in an effort to gain control over the company. See id. at § 2543. This includes
long-standing shareholders, shares acquired by gift, inheritance, bequest, etc., shares
acquired pursuant to stock splits, dividends, or reclassifications, and shares that do not
include voting rights. Id. An exception also covers stock acquired directly from the
corporation or with the consent of the corporation. Id. For a more detailed explana-
tion of the intricacies of the Pennsylvania statute, see James F. Nasuti & Jeffrey B.
Rotwitt, The Pennsylvania Corporation. Legal Aspects of Organization and Opera-
tion, 30 Corp. Prac. Series 2d. (BNA) (May 21, 1997).
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on and including the date the bidder acquired 20% ownership. 130 If
the shareholders do not receive the highest price paid, then the trans-
action will require approval from the shareholders, not including the
bidder.
2. Other Constituencies
Corporate directors have a fiduciary relationship'31 to their corpo-
rations and are held to the standard of care that ordinarily prudent
persons would exercise under similar circumstances. 132 "Directors are
required to devote themselves to corporate affairs with a view to pro-
moting the common interest of all shareholders.' 1 33 Pennsylvania
law, prior to 1990, provided that directors owed a primary fiduciary
duty to shareholders, although directors could consider other factors
when contemplating the future direction of the corporation. 34 This
was consistent with traditional corporate notions of fiduciary duty.' 35
130. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2541-48 (West 1995). This provision is activated
when a "control transaction" occurs. Id. "Control transaction" is defined in § 2542 as
the "acquisition by a person or group of the status of a controlling person or group."
Id. at § 2542. "Controlling person or group" is defined within § 2543(a) as a holder of
at least 20% of the votes that all shareholders would be entitled to cast in an election
of directors. Id. at § 2543(a). The shareholder right to demand the highest price the
bidder has offered for all of the shares is outlined in § 2546(c). Id. at § 2546(c). "Fair
value" is defined in § 2542 as "a value not less than the highest price paid per share by
the controlling person or group at any time during the 90-day period ending on and
including the date of the control transaction plus an increment representing any value,
including, without limitation, any proportion of any value payable for acquisition of
control of the corporation, that may not be reflected in such price." Id. at § 2542.
131. "Although the directors are not agents of the shareholders in the legal sense,
they are considered to be quasi-trustees who are subject to 'fiduciary duties' owed to
the corporation; in essence, these duties amount to the same kind of duty of loyalty
and duty of care that an agent owes to his or her principal." Klein & Coffee, supra
note 14, at 126. Although corporate boards have tremendous discretion, they are
traditionally guided by the principle that their role is to generate profit for stockhold-
ers. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 'raditionally, share-
holders are considered owners who have an absolute property right in the corporate
entity. See Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constitu-
ency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 163, 168 (1991).
The shareholders have exercised their prerogative to elect the board of directors to
represent them. Id. at 190. As such, the board of directors owes its fiduciary duty to
the group that elected it. Id.
132. See Nasuti & Rotwitt, supra note 129, at A-70; see also 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1712(a) (West 1995) (describing generally the fiduciary relationship between direc-
tors and the corporation).
133. See Nasuti & Rotwitt, supra note 129, at A-70.
134. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8363 (Purdon's 1988) (repealed Dec. 19, P.L. 834,
No. 198, § 306, imd. effective). Former §§ 8361 to 8367, which were added by Act
1986, Nov. 28, P.L. 1458, No. 145, § 1, related to standard of care, justifiable reliance,
and personal liability of directors and prior to repeal were amended by Act 1988, June
30, P.L. 464, No. 79, § 6, and Act 1988, Dec. 21, P.L. 1444, No. 177, § 203. For subject
matter of repealed § 8363, see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 512, 516, 1712, 1716, 5712,
5716 (West 1995).
135. See supra note 131.
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With the passage of Pennsylvania's 1990 anti-takeover legislation, it
was acknowledged by the state legislature that the loss of jobs and
corporate presence that accompanied post-hostile takeover liquida-
tions was a grave enough threat to allow directors to, in some cases,
subordinate the interests of equity investors to the interests of the cor-
poration as a whole with respect to the community at large.136 In light
of this threat, Pennsylvania changed its approach to corporate fiduci-
ary duties by providing that directors were no longer required to con-
sider shareholders interests as "dominant or controlling.' 13 Directors
were to protect the best interests of the corporation which requires
consideration of "shareholders, members, employees, suppliers, cus-
tomers and creditors... and... communities."' 38
The provision specifically condoned the sacrifice of short-term
shareholder interests in the name of long-term vision.'39 Many Penn-
sylvania Fortune 500 companies, including Conrail, strongly supported
the legislation despite the possible adverse share price effects.' 4
Other organizations, such as the AFL-CIO and the Pennsylvania
Chamber of Business and Industry, also advocated for the statute's
passage.'4'
Despite local support, the statute was met with substantial national
opposition. Forty-two prominent business, law, and economics profes-
sors from across the country petitioned Governor Casey and legisla-
136. See supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text regarding the debate surround-
ing the anti-takeover legislation. It is interesting to note the development of these
non-shareholder concerns, considering that regulation of securities markets and con-
trol transactions was originally motivated on the federal level by a concern for share-
holders. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Contro4 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L Rev. 1, 24-25 (1978)
(stating that shareholder protection was the sole goal of Congress). States had regu-
lated the securities markets prior to federal involvement with "blue sky" laws that
were similarly designed to protect the public from "speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky."' Cary, supra note 87, at 1598 (citing
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917)).
137. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 512(a), 515(b), 1721 (Vest 1995). The language
regarding "dominant or controlling" is directly from § 515(b). The effect of such a
provision is to permit the board, when confronted with a takeover bid, to implement
defense strategies even when doing so would not be in the best interests of sharehold-
ers, so long as some other constituency would be benefited. See Chandy, supra note
31.
138. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 515(a)(1) (West 1995) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at § 515(a)(2). The legislature made it clear to Pennsylvania courts that it
was repudiating the holdings of the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See infra note 190
and accompanying text. The Revlon holding required directors to act in the best in-
terests of shareholders once a company was "in play" by maximizing shareholder
value. Id.
140. Typically, companies choosing to be governed by anti-takeover statutes suf-
fered a slight share price decrease. See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of
Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111, 136 (1987).
141. See Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 120, at 5.
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tors, raising strenuous objections.1 42 Furthermore, a number of
pension fund managers expressed their displeasure with various provi-
sions.1 43 Richard C. Breeden, former chairman of the SEC, stated
that the act "could do substantial damage to shareholders' well-estab-
lished federal right to ... replace a board of directors .... [T]he risks
of entrenched, self-perpetuating boards of directors would become
much greater. ' 144 By allowing a corporate board to ignore a tender
offer and justify the decision by claiming to serve a greater community
interest, directors were increasingly able to insulate them from possi-
ble changes in corporate control.
The provision was motivated in part by the threatened takeover of a
large Pennsylvania corporation, Armstrong World Industries, Inc., by
a Canadian family.145 It was feared that there would be job losses and
plant closings resulting from the Armstrong takeover that would be
detrimental to Pennsylvania's economy.' 46 The potential takeover of
Armstrong was similar to that of Conrail because thousands of jobs
were at stake.147 The two situations were different, however, because
Armstrong was being threatened by a single hostile bidder.148 Conrail
was being courted by two bidders-one friendly and the other
hostile. 14
9
Debate on the floor of the state legislature was passionate and,
although older provisions were already in operation, 50 the amend-
ments prompted a review of the legislation in its entirety.' 51 Senator
Brightbill was convinced that the proposed legislation amounted to
142. Id.; see also supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text (describing adverse
effects of anti-takeover legislation such as declining share prices, chill on investment,
and emasculation of shareholder power to effectuate change of corporate control by
tendering into a lucrative bid).
143. Michael W. Armstrong, At Least 67 Firms Buck Act 36, Phila. Bus. J., July 30-
August 5, 1990, at 1. The California Public Employees Retirement Fund indicated it
might withdraw $500 million of stock holdings in Pennsylvania companies. See Klein
& Greenbaum, supra note 120, at 5.
144. Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 120, at 5.
145. McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at Pennsylvania-5. In fact, Senator Noah
W. Wenger, who introduced the legislation, wrote to a colleague, "[tihe management
team at Armstrong has urged me to enact this legislation as quickly as possible." Id.;
see also Silberman, supra note 37, at 130.
146. Silberman, supra note 37, at 130; Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 120, at 5.
147. See supra note 146. The various proposed compromises would have resulted
in significant regional shifts of business. Henry J. Holcomb, Ports Plan Their Positions
As They Await Conrail Fate, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 14, 1997, at C1. The new company
would have altered the configuration of rail lines which would impact infrastructure
development alongside the tracks, as well as ports. Id.
148. McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at Pennsylvania-5.
149. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 134.
151. See infra notes 152-73.
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the "most important issue that [the General Assembly would] deal
with [that] year."152
Senator Brightbill argued that "the development of the fiduciary
principles in the corporate field had historically been based upon the
proposition that corporate managers owe their primary responsibili-
ties to the owners of the corporation, the shareholders. ' 153 Although
the Senator conceded that other constituencies should be considered,
he felt strongly that shareholders should not be demoted to an
equivalent or lesser consideration.' Broadening a director's respon-
sibility to ambiguously-defined other constituencies makes it increas-
ingly difficult for a board of directors to determine the proper course
of action. The new law provided no standards for deciding between
the often competing interests.155 Additionally, Senator Brightbill
feared that the statute's provisions were overbroad:
Once the courts get ahold of this provision, once they start plugging
this fiduciary relationship into suits by suppliers, into suits under
collective bargaining agreements, into suits by communities, once
directors start getting sued by suppliers, employees, communities
and everyone else, we are going to find out that we painted tonight
with a broad brush. 156
One legislator went even farther in criticizing the other constituencies
concept. Senator Vincent Fumo, the then-ranking Democrat on the
Senate Appropriations Committee, compared it to socialism and char-
acterized it as the beginning of the end of the capitalist order."5 His
argument rested on the conception of stock ownership as a fundamen-
tal property right that must be protected by the government.' 5 In
addition to the historical and commonplace meaning of ownership,
Senator Fumo pointed out that stockholders have a widespread expec-
tation that their investment will be protected by the fiduciaries-that
is, the board of directors.159
152. S. 1310, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1989) at 1503
(remarks of Sen. Brightbill).
153. Id. (remarks of Sen. Brightbill, quoting David Ruder, former law professor
and Chairman of the SEC).
154. Id. (remarks of Sen. Brightbill).
155. Although no state expressly provides standards for determining which inter-
ests are more important than others, there is support for the theory that these stan-
dards are self evident. See, e.g., Wallman, supra note 131.
156. S. 1310-1747, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1989) at 1504
(remarks of Sen. Brightbill).
157. Id. (remarks of Sen. Fumo).
158. Id- at 1504-05. The implication was that because (1) investors "own" shares in
the corporation with the expectation of profiting from those shares and (2) investors
elect the board of directors, the board should serve the interests of the investors first.
The other constituency provision allows the board to ignore, to some extent, share-
holder interests which, in turn, is arguably an affront to the right afforded by the
property ownership.
159. Id.
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It was noted that "in many cases [workers] lost their jobs because of
the same management [the legislature was] trying to protect .... Gov-
ernment's responsibility is not to insulate the people in the boardroom
who, by and large, have caused the problem."' 60 Senator Fumo
quoted an editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer which stated:
This bill would hurt Pennsylvania's economy immediately by mak-
ing the stock in Pennsylvania companies less attractive to investors.
Big institutional investors in particular are uninterested in compa-
nies where the shareholders can't push management to improve. In
the longer term it will hurt Pennsylvania companies by allowing in-
ept managers to stay in control.16
Senator Fumo pointed out that the legislation would make it more
difficult for young companies to raise equity capital. 162 He noted that
"similar provisions in other legislatures ... resulted in depressed val-
ues of the shares of the stock.' '1 63
Despite strong language opposing the amendments, evidence sup-
porting the provision was equally forceful. For example, Michael
Swartz, former chairman of a local Pennsylvania union, pleaded with
the Senate to "give some very serious thought to the 'human cost' of
takeover madness and why we must stop it here in our state.' ' 164 In a
letter to one senator he continued:
[H]ostile takeovers brought about the destruction of the Fruehauf
Corporation .... I saw the pain and grief on the faces of the men
and women I worked with when the layoffs and then the shutdown
hit. I know the same feelings must have ripped through the folks at
Fruehauf .... I've listed the names and hometowns of just some of
the more than a thousand Pennsylvanians who lost jobs at Fruehauf.
These folks and their kids, their homes, and their communities are
really what this Bill is all about.' 65
160. Id. at 1510.
161. S. 1310-2108, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1990 (Pa. April 23, 1990) at
1956 (remarks of Sen. Fumo quoting A Shameful Bill: It Looks as if it's Too Late to
Halt the 1990 Shareholder Rip-Off Act, Phila. Inquirer, April, 21, 1990), at 8-A.
162. Id. at 1949 (remarks of Sen. Fumo) (arguing that companies are made less
attractive to investors with the presence of state anti-takeover provisions).
163. Id.
164. S. 1310-1747, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1989) at
1506.
165. Id. (remarks of Sen. Lincoln). Fruehauf, a profitable Pennsylvania corpora-
tion employing 25,000, was the target of a hostile takeover by corporate raider Asher
Edelman. Id. A "white knight" group rescued the company by engineering a lever-
aged buy-out and paying greenmail to Edelman in excess of $100 million. Id. Green-
mail is "[tjhe practice of purchasing a large block of stock and then threatening a
control fight with the hope and expectation that the target will purchase those shares
at a significant premium over market." Solomon, supra note 31, at 1061. After the
acquisition, Fruehauf was burdened with massive debt and began incurring significant
losses related to the extraordinary debt payments. S. 1310-1747, 173d General Assem-
bly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1989) at 1506. Fruehauf began selling off various units
piecemeal and ceased all operations 3 years after paying off Edelman. Id.
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Senator Wenger pointed out that giving paramount consideration to
shareholders does not really clarify the applicable standards that a
board must apply in fulfilling its fiduciary duty.' Short-term arbi-
trageurs have vastly different interests than long-term stockholders,
and simply directing boards to act in the interests of "shareholders" is,
therefore, ambiguous.
On the floor of the General Assembly during the debate about the
provisions, Senator Wenger argued that a director's fiduciary respon-
sibility should be to shareholders as well as other components of the
"total corporation."167 This concept of the "total corporation" en-
compasses a wide range of interests including, but not limited to, em-
ployees, bondholders, and local communities.' s It was appropriate,
in the Senator's view, to encourage those with the courage to "look at
the big picture in the long run, the best interests of their corporation
and what it does to the economy."' 69 Senator Armstrong stated, "I
think it is time we show the people, these corporate raiders who are
coming to Pennsylvania that Pennsylvania is going to take a stand and
we are going to watch out for our corporations, our employees and
our communities."'
1 70
Ultimately, the sentiment of the Pennsylvania legislature and the
philosophy that undermined the provisions were well summed up by
Senator Armstrong:
Once again, to Sam Belzberg [the Canadian bidder for Armstrong]
and Carl Icahn [a well-known corporate raider] and all the other
corporate raiders, you do not have a friend in Pennsylvania when
this bill passes. You really do not. We do not want you here. We
do not think it is in the best interests of Pennsylvania to have you
here.17 1
The House joined the spirited support for the bill with hopes that
passing such an anti-takeover measure would send a loud and clear
message to those "who would make ...Pennsylvania corporations
simple, quick-profit chop shops... that is, Pennsylvania is no longer
your playground." 7
2
166. S. 1310-1747, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1989) at 1507
(remarks of Sen. Wenger).
167. Id-
168. See Wallman, supra note 131, at 179.
169. See supra note 166, at 1507.
170. S. 1310-1747, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1989) at 1509
(remarks of Sen. Armstrong).
171. S. 1310-2108, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1990 (Pa. April 23, 1990) at
1951 (remarks of Sen. Armstrong).
172. H. 28, 173d General Assembly, Sess. of 1990 (Pa. April 24, 1990) at 778 (re-
marks of Rep. F. Taylor discussing S. 1310, PN 2108).
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The bill was passed in both the Pennsylvania House and Senate by
overwhelming majorities.'73 Although the provisions dissuaded the
Armstrong takeover, 174 its impact on future mergers and acquisitions
was highly speculative. The Conrail merger fight marked the law's
first major test.' 75
B. The Pennsylvania Statute's Effect on the Merger
Negotiations concerning Conrail had begun in earnest in early Oc-
tober, 1996, when CSX agreed to Conrail's merger agreement
terms. 176 They included (1) putting the combined company's head-
quarters in Philadelphia, (2) maintaining most of Conrail's existing
rail routes, (3) providing LeVan the opportunity to succeed Snow
within two years, and (4) offering LeVan a salary increase.' 77
1. Fair Price Provision
On October 15, 1996, Conrail and CSX publicly announced their
merger agreement, which was valued at approximately $8.4 billion.'78
The two-tier tender offer proposal offered $92.50 per share for 40% of
Conrail's stock.'7 9 The remaining 60% would be exchanged for CSX
stock.180
This type of two-tier front-loaded offer was exactly what the fair
price provision was intended to prevent.' 8' Once the bidder, in this
case CSX, acquired 20% of the voting rights, Pennsylvania law pre-
vented it from offering a lower value for the back-end shares.' 2 CSX,
although considered a friendly bidder, was being thwarted by Penn-
sylvania law. Although the law did not seem intended to prevent a
company from being taken over by a friendly bidder, that was its ef-
fect at this stage of the negotiations.'83
173. The House of Representatives approved the act by a vote of 183-17. Id. at 779-
80. The Senate approved the act 43-6. McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at Penn-
sylvania-6.
174. See Tascarella, supra note 111, at 22.
175. See Cassel, supra note 23, at C1.
176. Steve Lipin, et al., Norfolk Southern Bids $9.1 Billion for Conrail, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 24, 1996, at A3; Charles Slack, On A Collision Course CSX Picks Up Steam in
Fight For Conrail, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1996, at D14.
177. See Machalaba & Mathews, supra note 16, at 1.
178. CSX and Conrail to Combine in Pro-Competitive, Strategic Merger, PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra Part I.B.3.
182. See supra Part II.A.1.
183. This unintended outcome was a result of the vague definition of "Interested
Shareholder" in the statute. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 45. An interested
shareholder is defined as including "the shareholder who is a party to the transaction
or who is treated differently from other shareholders and any person, or group of
persons, that is acting.., with the interested shareholder." 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
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By October 23, 1996, Conrail stock had climbed to over $95 per
share from offers in the $70 range one month earlier. I The following
day, Norfolk launched a competing $100 per share all-cash bid.'"
Conrail's directors agreed to review the offer, but reiterated to share-
holders that the merger with CSX was in their best interests.,' By
November 5, 1996, Conrail had tendered 56,634 shares to CSX.5
This was a mere fraction of the total1" and demonstrated the share-
holders' displeasure with the lower bid. In response, on November 6,
1996, CSX raised the cash portion of its offer to $110 per share."8 9
Although still two-tiered, the offer now promised more than Norfolk
on the front end. Conrail also agreed to continue to ignore other suit-
ors, including Norfolk, who were willing to offer a higher bid.'
§ 2538(d) (West 1995). This could apply to a hostile bidder or, as in this instance, a
friendly bidder.
184. CSX Net Falls 7.2% Because of Purchase of Chunk of Conrail, Wall St. J., Oct.
24, 1997, at C4.
185. Norfolk Southern Commences Tender Offer to Acquire Conrail Shares for SO0
Per Share, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 24, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS
Database.
186. Conrail Advises Shareholders To Await Board Response To Norfolk Southern
Unsolicited Offer Before Taking Any Action, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 23, 1996, avail-
able in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
187. CSX and Conrail Amend Merger Agreement, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 6, 1996,
available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
188. There were approximately 90 million shares of Conrail voting shares outstand-
ing. See id; see also Form SCD 13D A00, Conrail Exhibit 99 - OFFER TO
PURCHASE FOR CASH ALL OUTSTANDING SHARES OF COMMON
STOCK AND SERIES A ESOP CONVERTIBLE JUNIOR PREFERRED STOCK
(INCLUDING, IN EACH CASE, THE ASSOCIATED COMMON STOCK
PURCHASE RIGHTS) OF CONRAIL INC. AT $115 NET PER SHARE BY AT-
LANTIC ACQUISITION CORPORATION, A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY
OF NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION. (EdgarPlus Feb. 13, 1997) [herein-
after "Exhibit 99"], at 3.
189. CSX and Conrail Amend Merger Agreement, Nov. 6. 1996, supra note 187.
190. There were two important factors that contributed to this stance. First. Con-
rail had agreed to a no-shop provision in the original merger agreement with CSX
that prevented Conrail directors from participating in proposals from other suitors
until April 15, 1997. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 4. at 680 (citing § 4.2 of the
Merger Agreement). Second, Pennsylvania's other constituency provision gave Con-
rail's board the leeway to continue disregarding Norfolk's higher bid. See supra Part
I.B.2.
Delaware courts have held that shareholders must be given primary consideration
in a takeover context. See Revlon, Ina v. MacAndreivs & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that once it becomes clear that a corporation will be
sold or broken up, the board has a duty to conduct an auction or by some other means
seek to obtain the highest price for shareholders), and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (holding that defensive tactics used by directors
must be executed only if the directors have a reasonable ground for believing that a
danger to corporate policy existed and that the response was reasonable in relation to
the threat posed). Pennsylvania, however, has no such law. See Dennis J. Block &
Jonathan M. Hoff, Conrail/CSX: Pennsylvania Law on Different Track titan Delaware,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 27, 1997, at 1. In fact, the Pennsylvania legislature modified the ex-
isting anti-takeover statute in 1990 to clarify to Pennsylvania courts that it repudiated
the Revlon decision. See Nasuti & Rotwitt, supra note 129, at A-70.
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On November 8, 1996, Norfolk responded by raising its offer to
$110.191 This offer was $17 or 18% higher than the blended two-tiered
CSX scheme. Further, CSX had yet to overcome the fair price provi-
sion, which required shareholders to opt out of the provision if they
were interested in pursuing CSX's offer."9
Conrail shareholders were allowed to opt out 93 of the provision
and a shareholder meeting was called by the board to vote on opting
out.1 9 4 A corporation could opt out at any time by amending its arti-
cles of incorporation.195 Many Pennsylvania companies had already
chosen to opt out of the statute. 196 Ironically, in most instances, they
were the same companies the Act was designed to protect.' 97
In the meantime, CSX immediately offered to buy 19.9% of Conrail
stock, which amounted to approximately 17.9 million shares. 198 This
allowed them to begin acquiring shares without triggering the fair
price provision and rendering its back-end stock offer illegal.' 99 At
the Conrail shareholder meeting on January 17, 1997, shareholders re-
fused to opt out of the fair price provision."' 0 A "yes" vote would
have allowed CSX to purchase additional shares of Conrail, increase
its holdings to 40%, and effectively seal the merger. Fifty-three per-
cent of all those voting, however, voted against opting out.20 ' Share-
191. Norfolk Southern Increases Offer for Conrail, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 8, 1996,
available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
192. See supra notes 119-120.
193. See supra note 120.
194. Greg Edwards, CSX, Conrail Defend Deal, Roanoke Times & World News,
Dec. 12, 1996, at B10; Harrisburg Patriot, CSX Moves to Buy More Conrail Stock,
Associated Press, Dec. 7, 1996, at A8.
195. S. 1310-2108, 173d. General Assembly, Sess. of 1989 (Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) at
1953 (remarks of Sen. Fisher). Conrail opted out of two provisions that have not been
discussed: the disgorgement (15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2572 (West 1995)) and con-
trol-share acquisition provisions (15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Ch. 25, Subch. G); Justin P.
Klein & Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, Takeover Law: Many Pennsylvania Companies Opt
Out, 15 Nat'l L. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 15; see also William H. Clark, Jr., Corporations
Must Decide on Anti-Takeover Act Opinions, 13 Pa. L.J. Rep. 25 (June 25, 1990), at 4
(discussing the decision corporations were faced with regarding opting out after the
Pennsylvania law was enacted).
196. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
197. See Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 120, at 5. Studies have shown that upon
opting out of the major Pennsylvania anti-takeover provisions, companies exper-
ienced a significant positive increase in share price on average. See McGurn &
Spatola, supra note 42, at Pennsylvania-9. However, companies that opted out of the
control share provision, but not the other constituency provision, experienced no sig-
nificant change in share price. Id.
198. CSX and Conrail to Combine in Pro-Competitive, Strategic Merger, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
199. The fair price provision does not apply to a tender offeror until the offeror
acquires a control amount of stock, which in Pennsylvania is 20%. See supra Part
II.A.1.
200. Conrail Shareholders Overwhelmingly Vote Against Opt Out, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Jan. 17, 1997, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
201. Rip Watson, Conrail, Norfolk Soften Stance in Wake of Merger Vote, J. of
Comm., Jan. 22, 1997.
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holders unaffiliated with Conrail or CSX voted overwhelmingly, by a
margin of 92%, against the proposed opt out.2 2 Supporting the opt
out would have indicated either that the shareholders supported the
coercive two-tier scheme, or, at least, that they supported the CSX bid
for the corporation despite a lack of enthusiasm for the offer price.
David Goode, CEO of Norfolk, felt the shareholder vote was the
key to Norfolk's victory in overcoming Conrail's resistance to merge
with Norfolk." 3 He saw the vote against the opt out as a "resounding
vote for Norfolk."' Although Conrail shareholders seemed to be
supportive of Norfolk's bid in any case, Norfolk's last minute offer to
purchase 9.9% of the stock at $115 if the shareholders voted against
the opt out invariably sweetened the pot.205
The fair price provision effectively protected the shareholders from
being forced to tender into a two-tiered offer. Therefore, CSX was
compelled to offer an all-cash deal, and, in the face of increasing Nor-
folk bids, CSX finally offered shareholders $115 per share."° As in-
tended, the fair price provision guaranteed the shareholders a better
deal. It frustrated LeVan's goals, however, of effectuating a smooth
merger with CSX. The fair price provision gave Norfolk the opportu-
nity to offer a counter-bid that surpassed CSX. In light of the escalat-
ing bids, CSX was ultimately forced to negotiate with Norfolk."°
LeVan was prepared to sacrifice Conrail's independence to merge
with CSX, but the fair price provision prevented him from sacrificing
shareholder interests to do it.
2. Other Constituencies
At the Conrail shareholder meeting, Joseph Folk, a 20-year Conrail
veteran, voiced the same concern that helped prompt the Penn-
sylvania legislature to pass the anti-takeover provisions-short-term
shareholders who cared little about the company and its future had
more influence on the outcome of the merger than employees who
had worked with the company for decades.2 1s He spoke out against
the arbitrageurs, who overwhelmingly voted against the opt out provi-
sion and asked why "stock traders who have owned [Conrail] shares
202. Christopher Dinsmore, Conrail Voters Reject CSX Bid, Virginian-Pilot &
Ledger-Star, Jan. 18, 1997, at Al.
203. Justin Martin & David Goode, Surviving A Head-On Collision, Fortune, April
14, 1997, at 159, 160.
204. 1L
205. Norfolk offered to buy only 9.9% of the stock because they were constrained
by Conrail's poison pill defense scheme. See infra Part II.C.1. & notes 242-47. Poison
pill schemes are a defensive tactic which make a hostile bid more difficult by diluting
the value of a company's stock if a large percentage of it is acquired by a hostile
bidder. Id
206. See supra note 200.
207. Machalaba & Mathews, supra note 16.
208. Andrew Cassel, Conrail Bets Its Future On Arbitrageurs, Philadelphia In-
quirer, Jan. 26, 1997, at Dl.
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for one or two months" should have more influence than workers and
investors who have been with the company since its inception.20 9
The first two terms of LeVan's original agreement 210 with Snow,
putting the combined company's headquarters in Philadelphia and
maintaining most of Conrail's existing rail routes, suggest that LeVan
was attempting to protect other constituencies. Conrail's presence in
Philadelphia affected the city's economy, and the existing rail routes
provided economic growth for the adjacent areas.211 CSX's commit-
ment to continue Conrail's existing operations should have quelled
the typical takeover concerns of job loss and economic withdrawals.2 12
On October 15, 1996, Snow announced that "[t]his dynamic combina-
tion is a 'win-win' transaction for the shareholders ... our customers
and the communities we both serve. ' 213 The rhetoric was not limited
to the once all-important shareholders.
When Norfolk initially launched its competing all cash bid for $100
per share,214 the Conrail board of directors advised shareholders to
ignore the Norfolk bid because the "[b]oard had already carefully
considered the relative merits of a merger with Norfolk [and] had
unanimously determined that a merger with CSX was in the best in-
terests of Conrail and its constituencies. ' 215 By relying on the other
constituencies provision, Pennsylvania's tough anti-takeover law pro-
vided Conrail's management with enough leeway to continue to hold
Norfolk at bay. Conrail's board invoked this provision to justify its
disregard for Norfolk's higher-valued bid that benefited the short-
term interest of shareholders.
It is unclear how Conrail balanced the interests of shareholders with
those of other constituencies. Shareholders were presented with a su-
perior offer from Norfolk, yet the Conrail board seemed convinced
that the best long-term interests of the corporation rested with
CSX.216 Despite the statutory grant of authority to hold the interests
of other constituencies in the highest regard, 2 17 the board was still
forced to go to the shareholders for support. As one observer put it,
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
211. Holcomb, supra note 147, at C1.
212. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
213. CSX and Conrail to Combine in Pro-Competitive, Strategic Merger, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
214. Norfolk Southern Commences Tender Offer to Acquire Conrail Shares for $100
Per Share, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 24, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS
Database.
215. Conrail Advises Shareholders to Await Board Response to Norfolk Southern
Unsolicited Offer Before Taking Any Action, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 23, 1996, avail-
able in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database (emphasis added).
216. Id.
217. See supra Part II.A.2.
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"[o]nly one constituency [shareholders] ha[d] a vote. 2 18 This situa-
tion illustrates the conflict that may arise between the Pennsylvania
provisions in this type of uncontemplated two-bidder situation. The
other constituencies provision was intended to give management the
ability to ignore unfriendly bids if it felt the future of the company was
at stake.2 19 The legislative debate, however, does not indicate that the
legislature contemplated this type of two-bidder situation." Regard-
less, Conrail management was attempting to use the provision to favor
one bidder over another and, in the process, deny shareholders the
highest price for their stock. The problem for Conrail's board was
that, in this situation, the other constituencies provision had no teeth.
If the statute had force, then Conrail should have been able to fend off
Norfolk's advances. Instead, the fair price provision rendered the
other constituencies provision meaningless by allowing shareholders
to unilaterally prevent CSX's bid." Shareholders, seemingly at odds
with management's concern for other constituencies,222 were still able
to accept the Norfolk bid.' The unenthusiastic early November
shareholder response to CSX's offer suggested that the value of the
bids was primarily influencing the outcome, not concern for other
constituencies.
On November 13, 1996, Norfolk seized on the ambiguity in the stat-
ute and accused Conrail of "subvert[ing] the intent of state law and
coerc[ing] Conrail shareholders into accepting an inadequate offer for
their shares." 4 Although the Pennsylvania law was intended to pre-
vent unfriendly takeovers, many of the provisions were ultimately
aimed at protecting shareholders.' Both Norfolk and CSX seemed
justified in claiming the law was meant to favor them. Presumably,
Norfolk could invoke the provisions aimed at shareholder protec-
tion,2 26 while CSX could rely on the anti-takeover provisions.' In
either case, it was unclear whether Conrail and its other constituencies
were truly in better hands with CSX. CSX was headquartered out-of-
state and it anticipated layoffs and down-sizing as a result of the
merger.22s From the standpoint of other constituencies in Penn-
sylvania, it was a toss-up between the two bidders.
218. Cassel, supra note 23, at C2 (quoting Henry Bryans, a lawyer with Drinker,
Biddle & Reath in Philadelphia).
219. See supra Part II.A.2.
220. Id.
221. See supra Part II.B.1.
222. See infra note 236 and accompanying advertisement.
223. See supra notes 25 & 203-05 and accompanying text.
224. Norfolk Southern Says Conrail Directors Continue to Ignore Fiduciary Duty,
PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 13, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
225. See supra Part I.B.
226. See supra Part II.A.1.
227. See supra Part II.A.2.
228. CSX and Conrail to Combine in Pro-Competitive, Strategic Merger, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
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Both CSX and Norfolk began a media blitz in January 1997, each
hoping to persuade the public that they were more responsive to Con-
rail's other constituencies. 2 9 It is noteworthy that all of the advertise-
ments were either addressed directly to shareholders, or implicitly
aimed toward them. 30
In a January 28, 1997, letter to shareholders, LeVan wrote, "[T]he
Conrail Board continues to believe that a sale to Norfolk is not in the
best interests of Conrail."'" Despite anticipated job losses as a result
of the consolidation, the chairmen of both CSX and Norfolk contin-
ued to articulate their concern for the broad-based constituencies af-
fected by the transaction." 2 Additionally, shareholder interests were
229. For the next several weeks, in anticipation of the Shareholder Meeting, Nor-
folk and Conrail (on behalf of CSX) ran competing advertisements touting their supe-
rior value to all constituencies. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1997, at C19, stating:
PROTECT YOUR INTERESTS
SUPPORT NORFOLK SOUTHERN'S
SUPERIOR $115 PER SHARE
ALL CASH OFFER.
Join those who are demanding that the Conrail Board secure the superior ben-
efits of the Norfolk Southern offer for all constituencies.
GREATER VALUE FOR SHAREHOLDERS
Norfolk Southern's $115 all-cash, all-shares offer... is worth 18% more than
CSX's current deal. And it does not subject you to the substantial equity
risk presented by receiving part of your payment in CSX stock...
BETTER FOR CONRAIL EMPLOYEES
A merger between CSX and Contrail would eliminate competitive rail ser-
vice in 64 cities, and ... these could add up to lost jobs. A Norfolk Southern/
Conrail system would have substantially less overlap...
A MORE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR SHIPPERS
A CSX/Conrail combination would eliminate competitive service in major
markets... A Norfolk Southern/Conrail combination will provide balanced
competition by creating a strong rail alternative to compete with CSX.
A STRONGER COMMITMENT TO THE ECONOMIES OF PHILADELPHIA AND
PENNSYLVANIA
Norfolk Southern is committed to maintaining a major operating presence in
Philadelphia... and will seek to promote employment [there].
See also Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at C9 (advocating that the CSX-Conrail merger had
"substantial upside potential"); Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at C15 (characterizing the
CSX offer as "inferior" to Norfolk's and suggesting that shareholders are being
tricked into accepting an inadequate bid); Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at Cll (comparing
Norfolk's offer to that of CSX); Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at C17 (encouraging share-
holders to support the CSX bid).
230. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1997, at C19, supra note 229.
231. See Conrail Board Fully Committed to CSX Merger (visited Jan. 28, 1997)
<http://www.conrail.connews/nr970128.htm> (citing contents of LeVan's open
letter).
232. See e.g., CSX and Conrail to Combine in Pro-Competitive, Strategic Merger,
PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
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highlighted because their approval to opt out of the fair price provi-
sion became a prerequisite for the Conrail/CSX merger to continue 33
On January 21, 1997, after Conrail shareholders refused to opt out
of the fair price provision, Norfolk printed a large "thank you" to
Conrail shareholders in a national advertisement.3-1 Its language ar-
ticulated Norfolk's effort to protect shareholders first:
We wish to congratulate you on your courageous resistance to Con-
rail's efforts to cram down CSX's inferior deal. Norfolk Southern
has strongly supported the rights of Conrail shareholders through-
out this battle. We look forward to the opportunity to work with
Conrail shareholders to achieve our shared goals.23
On January 29, 1997, Conrail printed an advertisement in a variety
of publications that articulated the various stakeholders-as opposed
to shareholders-that would benefit from the Conrail/CSX merger z31
Shareholders continued to come last in the Conrail rhetoric whereas,
233. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (regarding fair price provision).
234. Wall St. J. (advertisement), Jan. 21, 1997, at C17.
235. Id
236. Wall St. J. (advertisement), Jan. 29, 1997, at C9. The full text of the advertise-
ment follows:
WHY ARE CSX AND CoNRAIL
So COMMrrIED TO THEIR MERGER?
Because It Will Create The Most Efficient And Competitive
Transportation And Logistics Company In The Nation
... AND THIS MEANS MORE FOR EVERYONE
MORE FOR CUSTOMERS
More Comprehensive Single-Line Service
More Rail Competition
More Customers And Ports Served
More Truck Competitive Corridors
MORE FOR EMPLOYEES
Common Management Vision
Highly Compatible Cultures
Greater Opportunities To Participate In Future Growth
MORE FOR THE COMMUNITIES WE SERVE
More Capital Investment
Improved Safety By Greater Separation Of Freight And Passenger
Operations
Environmental And Safety Benefits From Reduced Truck Traffic
MORE FOR SHAREHOLDERS
More Opportunities For Growth
- More Access To Low-Sulfur Coal - More Utilities Served
- More Automotive Plants Served - More Auto Terminals
- More Steel Mills And Distribution Centers Served
More Operating Synergies From Companies With A Track Record Of
Achievement
Stronger Balance Sheet To Further Enhance Shareholder Value
THAT'S WHY CSX AND CONRAIL
ARE FuLLY COMMITrED TO THEIR MERGER
1997] 959
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despite the other constituencies provision, Norfolk continued to plead
to shareholders' short-term interests. The Conrail Board's ambivalent
reaction to Norfolk's superior offer directly resulted from the other
constituencies provision, which justified such a posture. Nevertheless,
an analyst with a large investment bank pointed out that "[f]or [Con-
rail] to object to shareholders tendering into what is demonstrably a
higher offer could run them into problems. 2 37 The Conrail board
didn't have to worry about legal problems-for example, breach of
fiduciary duty-because it was protected by the other constituencies
provision. 38 Yet, its disregard for short-term shareholder interests
provided Norfolk with an opportunity to attack CSX's offer. It is
probable that, had CSX agreed to an all cash offer from the beginning,
Norfolk would have been unable to mount such an effective cam-
paign. In such an event, the fair price provision would not have come
into play. Conrail would not have had to opt out of the provision and
shareholders would have been faced with only one real suitor. Nor-
folk could still have made a hostile bid, but the other constituencies
statute would give Conrail's board the justification to ignore the offer.
Although Norfolk could have continued to pursue a hostile offer, the
lack of Conrail board approval would make the process more difficult.
It seems that Pennsylvania law would not have interfered with the
merger had CSX avoided a two-tiered scheme.
Norfolk had made a tender offer for 9.9%-approximately 8.2 mil-
lion shares-in mid-January for $115 per share and, by early February,
66.8 million shares were tendered for the $115 per share bid.23 9 Share-
holders seemed to appreciate the higher offer and reacted favorably.
Apparently, the long-term opportunities of the Conrail-CSX merger
did not seem as lucrative as cashing out for Norfolk's higher offer.
C. Other Defensive Measures Taken by Conrail and CSX
Regardless of whether a company decides to be covered by a state
anti-takeover statute, it may adopt a variety of additional anti-take-
over devices often referred to as "shark repellents. ' '1 40 So long as
these charter and by-law provisions and other defenses do not conflict
with state statutes, they work in tandem with the state anti-takeover
211provisions.
237. Lynette Khalfani, Revised Norfolk Offer Draws Unusual Response from Con-
rail, Dow Jones News Service, Jan. 28, 1997, available in WESTLAW, DJNSPIus
Database (quoting James Higgins, an analyst with Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Se-
curities, Inc.).
238. See supra Part II.A.2.
239. Norfolk Southern Completes Tender Offer for 9.9% of Conrail Shares, PR
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 5, 1997, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
240. See Poison Pills, supra note 37, at 83.
241. Id.
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1. Poison Pills
Although not part of the anti-takeover provisions passed in 1990,
Pennsylvania law does allow the use of "poison pills" to deter hostile
bidders.24 "Poison pills," which exist in a variety of forms, are a type
of defensive tactic that make a hostile bid more difficult.243 One type
involves the distribution to existing shareholders of a new security, a
"right," that is triggered when the bidder acquires a certain amount of
stock in the target." At that time, shareholders of the target are enti-
tled to buy shares of the target that have not yet been sold, at a sub-
stantial discount, thereby diluting the value of the target shares held
by the bidder. 45
Pennsylvania's applicable statute specifically authorizes a security
that "limits any [shareholder] ... from exercising, converting, transfer-
ring or receiving the shares. '2 46 This gives the board the ability to
prevent a large shareholder from exercising the voting power of their
shares. Further, authorization is granted for provisions "concerning
rights or adjustments in the event of... merger.., or other funda-
mental changes."'"47
Several years earlier, on July 19, 1989, the Conrail board declared a
dividend distribution of one right for each share of common stock. 4
The right entitled the holder to purchase one common share at an
exercise price of $205.249 The rights could be exercised ten business
days after the acquisition by a person or group of 10% or more of the
outstanding shares. 0 Prior to that time, the board was authorized to
redeem the rights for $.005 per right."' Pursuant to the merger agree-
242. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2513(a) (West 1995).
243. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 14, at 186; see e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), affd 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding a type of
poison pill). There is no standard form of poison pill. Solomon, supra note 30, at
1137. Commonly, it is a Right to purchase a share of stock, distributed as a dividend
to shareholders, at any time within a specified period. Id. Generally, the Board may
redeem the Rights, if it chooses, until a certain designated date. Id. at 1063. The
exercise price of the Right is the estimated value of the stock in the future, which
means it has little present value. Id at 1137. The key is a "flip" provision that is
triggered when an outsider purchases a certain percentage of stock. Id. At that point,
the Rights become separately tradable and no longer redeemable. Id. If the outsider
attains control, and then causes the issuer to merge with itself, the Rights entitle the
holder to acquire shares of the acquiring corporation at a significant discount. Id.
244. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 14, at 185. The pill described in the accompa-
nying text is referred to as a "flip-in" pill. Id.
245. Id. at 187.
246. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2513(a) (West 1995).
247. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1525(b)(3) (\Vest 1995).
248. See Exhibit 99, supra note 188, at 4. On Oct. 2, 1995, one right was distributed
with respect to each outstanding Employee Stock Option Plan ("ESOP") share. Id.
249. Id
250. Id. at 4-5.
251. Id at 5.
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ment between Conrail and CSX, the Conrail board made the rights
inapplicable to CSX offers.252
After Norfolk increased its bid to $115 per share on December 20,
1996, Conrail recommended that shareholders reject it."-3 On January
13, 1997, Norfolk announced it would buy 9.9% or 8.2 million Conrail
shares"-4 for $115 per share, contingent on the defeat of the opt out of
the fair value provision- 55 This was the maximum amount Norfolk
could purchase without triggering the pill.2 5 6 The pill was never exe-
cuted because Norfolk never directly acquired more than 9.9% of the
stock.257
Conrail also agreed to a no-shop clause 258 with CSX that forbade
Conrail from engaging in negotiations with other suitors.25 9 Specifi-
cally, Conrail could negotiate with other bidders only if: (1) the fiduci-
ary duties of the board required such negotiations; and (2) those
negotiations took place within a strict time frame.260 The board of
directors was entitled to ignore rival offers, regardless of their
value.26'
2. The Legality of Conrail's Defensive Measures
On October 23, 1996, Norfolk sought a preliminary injunction in
federal court to block Conrail from executing the merger with CSX,
prevent Conrail's poison pill scheme, and enjoin the shareholder vote
that would allow Conrail to opt out of the fair price provision. 62 Con-
rail's attempt to merge with CSX and disregard Norfolk was argued to
be "without regard for the best interests of its shareholders or other
252. Id. at 2. Pennsylvania law allowed the board to discriminate against Norfolk,
in this manner. See supra note 246.
253. Conrail Rejects Norfolk Southern's Revised Hostile Offer, PR NEWSWIRE,
Dec. 20, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
254. See Exhibit 99, supra note 188, at 2; see also Norfolk Southern to Buy 9.9% of
Conrail if Shareholders Vote Against 'Opt Out' Proposal, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 13,
1997, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database (discussing Norfolk's offer to
shareholders).
255. See Exhibit 99, supra note 188, at 2.
256. See supra note 248-49.
257. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 4, at 711.
258. For a thorough discussion of the lock-up provisions of the original Conrail/
CSX merger agreement, see Garrity & Morton, supra note 4.
259. See Block & Hoff, supra note 190, at 1.
260. Id.
261. Although the business judgment rule generally insulates directors of liability
from ignoring rival bids, the no-shop provision contractually prevents directors from
doing so. Conrail had also agreed to a $300 million breakup fee payable to CSX if the
agreement between the two companies fell through. See Ron Carter, Conrail Saga
Continues This Week in Courtroom, The Columbus Dispatch, Feb. 24, 1997, at 3.
262. Complaint P4, Norfolk Southern Corp. (C.A. No. 96-CV-7167) (E.D.Pa. filed
October 23, 1996)[hereinafter Complaint]; Norfolk Southern Asks Court to Block
Conrail 'Poison Pill,' PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW,
PRNEWS Database.
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constituencies. ' 263 Norfolk alleged, among other things, that Conrail
breached its fiduciary duty to the shareholders as evidenced by the
coercive nature of the proposed CSX transaction, the poison pill, the
lock-up provision and various other parts of the merger agreement.
264
The court denied all the motions.265 The court held that the Conrail
board had nearly unlimited discretion to undertake any action it
deemed appropriate. 66 Further, the court suggested that although
Delaware law, for example, demands primary consideration for share-
holders' interests, this approach was "myopic" and misguided because
it ignored the important long-term interests of a corporation. 67 Rul-
ing on a later injunctive motion by Norfolk,2 s Judge VanArtsdalen
characterized the Delaware approach 2 69 as "replac[ing] the discretion
of [a] corporate board of directors who hopefully are sophisticated
practical business managers" wvith the less reliable business judgments
of judges.270 Although this logic is compelling in some circumstances,
the Pennsylvania court seemed to discount the potential conflict of
interest that often exists between directors and shareholders. 71
The predominant standard of judicial review of the actions taken by
a target company's board to defend their control was articulated by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 212 The
court noted the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting pri-
marily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders." '73 This analysis, however, was geared toward a single
bidder, hostile tender offer.2 74 Unocal's heightened standard of re-
263. Norfolk Southern Asks Court to Block Conrail 'Poison Pill,' PR NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
264. See Exhibit 99, supra note 188, at 47.
265. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail Inc., C.A. No. 96-CV-7167 and 96-7350,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996) (Bench Ruling of J. VanArt-
sdalen) (order denying preliminary injunction).
266. 1d; see Block & Hoff, supra note 190, at 1.
267. Norfolk Southern Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978.
268. Norfolk Southern Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978.
269. See supra note 190.
270. Norfolk Southern Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978. Courts rarely disturb a
decision reached by a board, or impose liability on board members, unless a history of
self-dealing, conflict of interest, or illegality is present. See Klein & Coffee, supra note
14, at 126. This principle is known as the "business judgment rule" and it presumes
that directors' decisions will not be second-guessed by the courts except in extreme
circumstances. See Block & Hoff, supra note 190.
271. A bidder is expected to change at least some of the target company's opera-
tions if it successfully acquires control. See Cox, supra note 38, at 23.23-23.24. In a
contest for corporate control, directors may act to improperly entrench themselves as
opposed to protecting the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See
Block & Hoff, supra note 190, at 1. In the Conrail example, it didn't appear the
interests of the board and the shareholders were coextensive.
272. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
273. Id at 954.
274. Id. at 953-55.
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view for board conduct in a takeover context did not contemplate a
two-bidder situation.
The Delaware court addressed this shortcoming of the Unocal deci-
sion in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 75 In this
case, two bidders were competing for control over Revlon. 76 One
bidder, Forstmann Little & Company, was a "white knight '2 77 and the
other bidder, Pantry Pride, Inc., was a hostile bidder.2 78 The court
held that when a board of directors has determined that the sale of a
corporation is inevitable, the board's fiduciary duty requires it to max-
imize shareholder wealth and "auction" the company.2 79 Revlon, by
contemplating a two-bidder situation, is a qualification of Unocal.211
It does not prohibit defensive measures; rather, it sets additional stan-
dards for the target board to act in its shareholder's best interest.2 8 '
The Delaware approach stands in stark contrast to Pennsylvania,
where fiduciary duties are not heightened or subject to any higher
burden of proof with respect to a potential or proposed acquisition or
control of the corporation.28 The Pennsylvania provisions specifically
rejected both the Unocal standard of heightened scrutiny, as well as
the Revlon auction duty, applied by Delaware Courts.2 83 In fact, the
Pennsylvania legislature went so far as to reverse the Delaware pre-
sumption and, instead, presume that the actions of a board in a take-
over context are in the corporation's best interest.284
Although the Pennsylvania court criticized the disregard Delaware
showed for long-term corporate interests in Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time Inc.,285 the Delaware Supreme Court embraced di-
rectors who took action to protect the long-term interests of a
company. 86 In this respect, although the Pennsylvania court didn't
refer to Delaware's Paramount holding, it followed the logic of the
275. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
276. Id. at 175.
277. See supra note 14.
278. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
279. Id. at 182.
280. See Cox, supra note 38, at 23.40.
281. Id.
282. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715(a) (West 1995); see also Klein & Greenbaum,
supra note 120.
283. See Block & Hoff, supra note 190, at 1.
284. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715(d) (West 1995).
285. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
286. Id. After Time and Warner Communications had finalized Time's acquisition
of Warner, Paramount Communications made a tender offer for Time, which Time's
board rejected in the belief that the merger with Warner was in the shareholder's best
long-term interests. Id. at 1143-49. The court held that the Revlon test was inapplica-
ble because the transaction furthered a long-term interest of the corporation. Id. at
1151. The court decided that the fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise
includes the selection of the time frame for achievement of corporate goals. Id. at
1154-55.
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holding in its judgment of the Conrail proceedings.a28 By permitting
them to balance the interests of constituents other than shareholders,
the Pennsylvania provision ultimately affords directors much greater
freedom in making corporate decisions and alliances when confronted
with a potential merger. As suggested by the advertisements zss dis-
cussed in part II.B.2, this balancing act is difficult to judge and, cou-
pled with the presumption in Pennsylvania that directors are acting in
the best interests of the company, 9 will rarely be questioned.
On January 9, 1997, the federal district court denied Norfolk's later
application for a preliminary injunction of the Conrail/CSX merger.290
Norfolk had alleged that the CSX acquisition of 19.9% of Conrail's
outstanding common stock should be aggregated with various direc-
tors' and officers' stock, which would form a controlling group pursu-
ant to the fair price provisions and would entitle the shareholders to
"fair value."29
The court identified two primary issues arising in the case: (1)
whether the no-shop/lock-out provision in the Conrail/CSX merger
agreement was enforceable; and (2) whether Conrail was obligated to
pay the fair value amount because the control transaction had been
triggered, as provided in the business corporation law.29 2
The court declined to change its earlier ruling that supported the no
shop provision.293 It reasoned that "it is expected that the parties will
act in good faith and will not deliberately go out and ... see if they
can get a better deal after having entered into a valid contract.
With respect to the argument that CSX actually represents a "con-
trolling group," Judge Van Artsdalen was unpersuaded that there was
an express agreement that Conrail directors and officers would vote
their shares in "locked step" with CSX.295 Furthermore, § 2541(b)
contains an "inadvertent transactions" escape hatch for groups that
accidentally acquire a controlling interest.296 Therefore, the court de-
nied Norfolk's motion for a preliminary injunction.297 Subsequently,
shareholders overwhelmingly voted against the Conrail proposal and,
287. See Block & Hoff, supra note 190, at 1.
288. See supra notes 229 & 234-36.
289. See supra Part II.A.2.
290. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail Inc., C.A. No. 96-7167 and No. 7350, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997).
291. Id. at *2-*3. This would, according to Norfolk, constitute a "group acting in
concert" as defined under § 2543. Id. at *8.
292. I1. at *4.
293. Id. *4-*5.
294. Id. at *5.
295. Id. at *8.
296. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2541(b) (West 1995). This escape hatch allows
groups, under certain circumstances, to avoid being considered a controlling group.
d.
297. Norfolk Southern, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978.
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in effect, sided with Norfolk.298 Norfolk appealed both rulings to the
Third Circuit and lost.299
D. The Outcome of The Negotiations
By December 19, 1996, CSX had already purchased 19.9% of Con-
rail stock,3"' which amounted to $870 million. CSX offered to buy
18,344,845 more shares through a second cash tender at $110 per
share.30 At that point, fewer than 100,000 shares had been tendered
into the CSX offer.3°
On January 14, 1997, Conrail printed a national advertisement sup-
porting the CSX merger by pointing out the 640% lifetime return on
Conrail stock °. 3  The intended inference was that a Board that pro-
duces such high returns can be trusted to successfully navigate a
merger.
CSX's offer was still approximately one billion dollars less than
Norfolk's $10.5 billion offer ($115 per share) °.3  Norfolk had spent
$75 million on the merger and Conrail took a $16 million pretax
charge for merger-related expenses in the fourth quarter of 1996.305
Moody's, in light of the tremendous debt incurred to finance both ten-
ders and the accompanying costs, downgraded the debt rating of both
CSX and Norfolk.30 6
On February 14, 1997, the CSX tender offer to acquire 18,344,845
shares was extended to March 14.307 Only 504,381 shares had been
298. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
299. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Ferrara, 111 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1997) (decision pub-
lished & without opinion). This appellate ruling was issued after Norfolk and CSX
agreed to divvy up Conrail. See Andrews Securities & Commodities Litigation Re-
porter, April 9, 1997, at 12; see also Cassel, supra note 23, at C2.
300. CSX and Conrail Increase Merger Consideration by $16 Per Share, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Dec. 19, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Wall St. J. (advertisement), Jan. 14, 1997, at C9.
304. See Susan Warner & Andrew Cassel, Conrail's Fate Will Be Put to the Test,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12, 1997, at C1.
305. Norfolk Southern Moves to Unseat Conrail Board as Negotiations Stall, Wall
St. J., Feb. 11, 1997, at B2.
306. Id. Rating agencies, such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's, evaluate the
credit risk of a company issuing debt. See Tamar Frankel, 1 Securitization: Structured
Financing, Financial Assets Pools, and Asset-Backed Securities 97 (1991). Conse-
quently, the companies with higher credit ratings are considered "safer" and are,
therefore, able to issue debt on more favorable terms. Each company would have to
borrow heavily to finance the joint tender. See Railroads Predict Rise in Earnings,
Traffic World, May 5, 1997, at 24. Indeed, on May 14, 1997, Norfolk issued $4.3 billion
of bonds and notes. See Norfolk-Based Firm Issues $4.3 Billion of Bonds and Notes,
Virginian-Pilot & Ledger Star, May 15, 1997, at D1. It was the biggest sale of invest-
ment-grade corporate debt to date. Id. CSX previously raised $2.5 billion from a
bond issue. Id.
307. CSX Extends Tender Offer, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 1997, available in
WESTLAW, PRNEWS Database.
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tendered thus far3"' and, by the end of February, it seemed clear that
Conrail shareholders would not tender into a less lucrative offer.
Snow subsequently sent LeVan a letter suggesting that Conrail would
have to be sold, and Norfolk would have to be brought into the
deal.3 ° 9 This was a significant change in strategy for the CSX board
that marked the beginning of the end for LeVan's dream of taking
over the merged Conrail-CSX railroad. 10
On March 3, 1997, Conrail announced that it was once again rene-
gotiating its merger agreement with CSX.3 11 Conrail said the new
agreement would offer shareholders $115 per share or $10.5 billion
total.3 2 One analyst felt that Conrail shareholders emerged as win-
ners from the compromise, in that they would now receive $115 per
share for stock worth barely $70 at the beginning of the merger con-
test in October.313 Such an outcome "[said] a lot for the power of
shareholders. 314
On April 8, 1997, CSX and Norfolk announced an agreement to
divide Conrail's routes and assets. 1 To accomplish the division, they
planned to form a jointly owned entity that will acquire all outstand-
ing shares of Conrail for $115 in cash per share.316 By May 1997, CSX
and Norfolk owned their respective shares of Conrail.317 They cannot
take over Conrail, however, until federal rail regulators approve the
break-up plan.318 It is still unclear how the transaction will affect
Pennsylvania or the long-term financial prospects of Norfolk or CSX.
Although both companies are optimistic3 19 about their own financial
conditions, many fear that job losses in Pennsylvania and other areas
will be significant. 20
308. Id
309. See Daniel Machalaba & Anna W. Mathews, Meeting in the Betrayal Suite,
Wall St. J. Eur., Mar. 5, 1997, at 1.
310. Id
311. See Charles Slack, CSX, Conrail Revisit Merger Norfolk Southern May Back
Deal, Richmond Tunes-Dispatch, Mar. 4, 1997, at Al.
312. See Machalaba & Mathews, supra note 309, at 1.
313. See Slack, supra note 311, at Al.
314. Id. at Al (quoting Peter Gleason, a Maryland based financial consultant).
315. Special Edition Conrail Newswire, CXS, NS Announce Agreement on Dividing
Conrail (April 9, 1997), <http://conrail.com/nevsjnw970409.htm.> Norfolk will buy
58% of Conrail for $5.9 billion, and CSX will acquire 42% for $4.3 billion. Id.; Rail-
roads Predict Rise in Earnings, Traffic World, May 5, 1997, at 24.
316. See Special Edition Conrail Newswire, supra note 315.
317. See Norfolk Southern, CSX Now Own Conrail, Virginian-Pilot & Ledger Star,
May 28, 1997, at Dl.
318. Id.
319. See Railroads Predict Rise in Earnings, supra note 315, at 24.
320. See John George, No Surprise: Conrail Breakup Brings Job Cuts, Phila. Bus.
J., June 27, 1997, at 3.
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PART III
CRITIQUE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE
In the battle for Conrail, both CSX and Norfolk claimed that the
weight of state law supported their position. Norfolk was correct in
claiming that the fair price provision protected shareholders from a
potentially coercive two-tier CSX bid. CSX was correct in claiming
that the other constituencies provision protected management from
being forced to succumb to a higher-valued tender offer that could,
potentially, negatively impact the Pennsylvania economy. The Penn-
sylvania legislature passed the anti-takeover provisions to protect
against a single hostile bidder. Yet, when confronted with multiple
bidders, the provisions created a stalemate. Conrail was ultimately
acquired, in part, by a hostile bidder, Norfolk, and Conrail's share-
holders were left with an extremely high tender price. This example
of the application of the Pennsylvania anti-takeover statute suggests
two important conclusions. First, highly complex and technical anti-
takeover legislation is counter-productive. And, second, hastily
passed anti-takeover legislation is ineffective because it fails to ac-
count for corporate complexity.
A. The Conrail Saga Should Remind State Legislatures that
Complex Anti-Takeover Statutes Are Counter-Productive
Corporate law continues to evolve in response to the ever-changing
structures of corporations.321 Despite the central role corporations
play in the American and global economy, states have been reluctant
to pass legislation that may be so narrowly tailored that it fails to ad-
dress the full scope of corporate possibilities. For example, although
the backbone of corporate law hinges on the concept of fiduciary duty
and the importance of defining a director's role on a corporate
board,322 this singularly important legal relationship is ambiguously
defined and constantly reinvented with every legal controversy.3z A
highly technical and specific law defining when directors breach their
fiduciary duty would create more problems than solutions.3 24 Instead,
courts are left to address each situation on an ad hoc basis.
321. Note the recent developments of limited liability companies and limited liabil-
ity partnerships, for example. See Glenn B. Davis & Barbara L. Bryaniarski, Choice
of Entity: Legal Considerations of Selection, 50 Corp. Prac. Series 3d. (BNA) (1997)
(discussing the basic forms of corporations).
322. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 591.
323. Id. Justice Frankfurter recognized the inherent complexities regarding fiduci-
ary duty:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to
further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe
as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?
And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
324. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 662-63, 667.
[Vol. 66
ANTI-TAKEOVER LAW
Similarly, state anti-takeover provisions that attempt to do too
much, like Pennsylvania's aggressive legislation, often fail to achieve
their stated goals. The Pennsylvania legislature attempted to insulate
local companies from foreign predators. By passing so many different
provisions, each with a different impact on tender offer and merger
negotiations, the State ultimately created a statute that, in some in-
stances, contradicts itself.
Beyond the statute's impact on the merger, a close examination of
the law reveals other more general problems. It is difficult to imagine
how the other constituencies provision could be enforced. First, when
there is a breach of fiduciary duty, the appropriate party to bring a
lawsuit would be a shareholder, through derivative action on behalf of
the corporation.3" If the breach is a result of the board ignoring other
constituencies in an effort to secure the highest bid for shareholders,
however, there is no incentive for a shareholder to bring suit. Further,
if a shareholder does bring suit-perhaps a hostile shareholder with a
duplicitous motive' 26 -damages would be impossible to determine be-
cause the harm would be to the community at large and the long term
interests of the corporation. This creates a conundrum for the Penn-
sylvania statute. Certainly it is possible for directors to violate their
fiduciary duties in Pennsylvania. 327 The other constituencies statute,
however, places the bar extremely high by justifying consideration of
non-shareholder interests. Directors can pursue nearly any corporate
strategy and claim they are fulfilling their fiduciary duty to some non-
shareholder constituent.
Second, it is exceedingly difficult to judge whether any given bidder
is actually better suited to protect other constituencies. Both CSX
and Norfolk claimed to better serve stakeholders as well as protect
long-term shareholder interests. It is difficult to imagine how a court
would objectively determine whether a board was justified in favoring
one bidder over another based on consideration of other
constituencies.
Underlying this problem is a philosophical identity crisis in corpo-
rate America. To date, the majority of state corporate law is dedi-
cated to the proposition that directors, as fiduciaries of the
corporation, are responsible for maximizing shareholder value.328
Although opponents of other constituencies provisions defend this as
a singular interest,329 it has been noted that different shareholders
325. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 52.
326. Often, derivative lawsuits are brought by plaintiffs with very small equity hold-
ings at the behest of attorneys. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 14, at 196.
327. See Block & Hoff, supra note 190, at 1 (discussing the impact of the other
constituency provision).
328. See supra note 131.
329. Wallman, supra note 131, at 187-92.
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with different investment schemes do not necessarily agree on a defi-
nition of maximized value.330
Ironically, it is arguable that Conrail ignored the non-shareholder
constituencies by ultimately agreeing to a deal that includes breaking
up the company between CSX and Norfolk. However, Senator
Brightbill's fear that everyone in Pennsylvania would file a lawsuit al-
leging a violation of the other constituencies provision has not yet oc-
curred.331 It is extremely doubtful that the shareholders will sue the
board for breach of fiduciary duty because, despite rhetoric to the
contrary, Conrail accommodated their interests first by ultimately ac-
ceding to the highest bid price set by Norfolk.
In this case, the provisions forced an expensive showdown between
CSX and Norfolk that left both companies in financial difficulty and
significant debt.332 Without the Pennsylvania statute, it is possible
that CSX and Norfolk would have come to a resolution much sooner,
before the bid escalated to such a high level. The other constituencies
provision gave CSX the false hope that its inferior bid might actually
succeed. This false hope cost all three companies dearly.
The fair price provision did succeed in protecting shareholders from
being coerced into a lesser-valued bid. Moreover, the various provi-
sions slowed down the process, allowing shareholders to exercise their
rights and ensure the highest possible value for their shares. This was
not, however, the overall intent of the Pennsylvania law.333
B. Hastily Passed Anti-Takeover Legislation Fails to Account for
Corporate Complexity
Many states, like Pennsylvania, passed anti-takeover laws in a mat-
ter of days,334 often in response to the imminent threat of a local hos-
330. Id. at 187.
331. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 152-75.
334. Although the adoption process of the 1990 amendments to Pennsylvania's
anti-takeover law spanned several months (they were introduced on October 20, 1989
and were signed into law, in a modified version, on April 27, 1990), this was a rela-
tively short process. See McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at Pennsylvania-5-6.
Other states moved with more zeal. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see
also McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing the haste with which other
states passed anti-takeover legislation).
When rumors circulated about a takeover of Boeing Corporation, for exam-
ple, the Washington legislature met in emergency session and approved a
bill, signed immediately by the governor, that had been drafted by Boeing
counsel. Arizona state officials, at the request of Greyhound Corporation,
introduced, adopted, and signed into law the Arizona Control Share Act in
three days. It took Illinois only two days and Minnesota only one to pass
their [anti-takeover] statutes.
Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Reorganizations 415 (West
1991).
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tile acquisition. 335 It is, therefore, not surprising that these hastily-
crafted statutes are less than perfect. The emergency measures are
arguably the result of quick compromise and overly ambitious legisla-
tors eager to be seen as zealous defenders of the community inter-
ests.33 6 The enactment of the Pennsylvania statute typifies such a
roughshod legislative process.
Pennsylvania legislators tailored the many provisions of the anti-
takeover legislation to deal specifically with the threatened Arm-
strong takeover.33 7 The provisions, however, are not as neatly applied
to other potential takeover situations, such as Conrail, where there
are two out-of-state bidders that threaten layoffs and plant closings.
Regardless, companies are able to pass anti-takeover provisions them-
selves.3  What the Pennsylvania General Assembly gave by way of
protecting shareholders' rights with the fair price provision, it seemed
to take away by protecting management with the other constituencies
provision. If state legislatures continue to insist on increasingly ag-
gressive and more complicated anti-takeover provisions, they should
conduct extensive analysis of a variety of scenarios to ensure the laws
will effectively apply to a wide range of potential situations. They
should begin by considering four important factors: (1) state corpo-
rate philosophy; (2) the anticipated number of bidders; (3) the antici-
pated type of bids offered; and (4) what type of bidder the state wants
to encourage.
First, the state legislature must assess the state's corporate philoso-
phy to decide whether a corporation should be primarily beholden to
shareholders, or to the community at large. The Pennsylvania legisla-
ture was forced to reevaluate the function and role of the corporation
335. See McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42. Companies facing imminent threats
from hostile bidders included Burlington Industries in North Carolina, Gillette in
Massachusetts, Greyhound in Arizona, Harcourt Brace Jovanoich in Florida, and G.
Heileman Brewing in Wisconsin. McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at 2. In fact, the
governor of Massachusetts signed the Massachusetts statute in the offices of Gillette.
See Oesterle, supra note 334, at 415-16.
336. The obvious alternative would be a more deliberative process including exten-
sive hearings and/or the establishment of legislative commissions to study the issue.
See McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at 2.
337. See Tascarella, supra note 111, at 22.
338. The defensive measures provided by the Pennsylvania statute could have been
accomplished by individual corporations without legislative action. John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control
Contests?, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 605, 605-06 (1997). Amendments to corporate articles
of incorporation, subject to requisite shareholder approval, could be passed with
much the same effect. Id. Shareholders would, however, probably be reluctant to pass
such corporate legislation knowing that hostile offers tend to increase share price,
while anti-takeover provisions tend to decrease share price. For a discussion of the
share price effect of the Pennsylvania anti-takeover legislation, see Chandy, supra
note 28; see also McGurn & Spatola, supra note 42, at 3. For a detailed description of
studies illustrating this relationship, see id. at Pennsylvania-7 to -11.
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in American society.339 The tenuous relationship between sharehold-
ers and directors and the amorphous concept of fiduciary duty made
the debate contentious. 340 Although corporations were traditionally
meant to serve the shareholder's profit interest,341 society is increas-
ingly demanding that state law recast corporate charters to implicitly
include community-wide goals.342 Any state legislature attempting to
pass anti-takeover legislation or amend existing laws must confront a
similar paradox. In constructing effective anti-takeover statutes, state
legislatures must determine whether they will embrace the emerging
trend and protect other constituencies, or whether they are more com-
fortable endorsing the traditional notion of fiduciary duties as owed to
shareholders. The debate on the floor of the Pennsylvania legislature
tracked this philosophical conflict.343 Unfortunately, in haste, the leg-
islation that passed was an irreconcilable combination of the two phi-
losophies. Some portions of the anti-takeover provisions-for
example, the fair price provision-was intended to protect sharehold-
ers and insure that they would be able to maximize their share
value. 3" Other portions, however-for example, the other constitu-
encies provision-was intended to protect management's ability to
subvert shareholder profit for community goals. 345  In certain cases,
like the Belzberg acquisition that prompted the debate in Penn-
sylvania,346 the provisions work well together as the legislation in-
tended. Belzberg was a single bidder.347 The fair price provision
prevented a coercive two-tier offer and the other constituencies stat-
ute ensured that boards had the authority to resist the threat. For
scenarios like Belzberg, the legislation was effective but, in other
cases, like the Conrail merger with CSX, the provisions worked
against one another. The process of creating anti-takeover legislation
must begin with a thorough assessment of corporate philosophy and
how it applies to a wide variety of situations.
Second, the state legislature should consider the possibility of multi-
ple bidders. Provisions that apply to a single hostile bidder may sim-
ply not work with two or even three bidders. In October, 1997, MCI
Communications Corporation went "in play" as British Telecommuni-
cations PLC, GTE Corporation, and WorldCom Incorporated all be-
339. See supra notes 150-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the debate
regarding corporate philosophy.
340. See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
342. See Wallman, supra note 131, at 167-68.
343. See supra notes 152-75 and accompanying text.
344. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
345. See discussion supra Part I.B.5.
346. See discussion supra note 145.
347. See McGurn & Spatola, supra note 43, at Pennsylvania-5.
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gan to compete for corporate control.348 Although the battle will not
take place in Philadelphia, the specter of three potential bidders
should give the Pennsylvania legislature cause for concern-their leg-
islation isn't tailored to deal with such a situation. If a similar situa-
tion arose in Pennsylvania, it is difficult to predict the result. The two
bidder Conrail situation was already beyond the contemplated scope
of the state's anti-takeover situation. Increasingly exotic situations
would only seem to move farther from the intended effect of the pro-
visions. The possibility that multiple bidders may compete for control
of a local company must be considered when envisioning how the vari-
ous provisions will interact.
Third, the state legislature should consider the types of bids that
may be offered in a takeover situation. Although CSX was considered
a "friendly" bidder, its two-tier bid set CSX at odds with Penn-
sylvania's fair price provision. The Conrail merger showed that, in a
two-bidder situation where the friendly bidder was making a two-tier
front-loaded inferior offer, the fair price provision rendered the other
constituencies provision meaningless." 9 Even if the other constituen-
cies provision was relevant to the final outcome of the negotiations, it
would be impossible to accurately assess which suitor would be best
for Conrail.350 The other constituencies provision inevitably leads to
the subordination of shareholder interests and confuses the role of
directors as fiduciaries.35' So long as shareholders will not be coerced
into tendering into a two-tier front-loaded offer, they will rarely be
persuaded to sacrifice their own interests for other constituencies
when confronted with a higher valued bid. Regardless of the commu-
nity-wide benefits of a merger, Pennsylvania law still leaves the final
decision in the hands of the shareholders, if there is a two-tier offer,
because the fair price provision effectively trumps the other constitu-
encies provision. Legislatures must consider the innovative ways in
which a company may attempt to coerce shareholders into tendering
their shares.
Fourth, the state legislature should determine exactly what it con-
siders a "friendly," as opposed to "hostile," bidder. In the case of
Conrail, it was difficult to tell who was the friendly bidder. Although
348. Stephanie N. Mehta, Bargain or Burden? The Question of MCI's Worth, Wall
St. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at B10; Steven Lipin, Battle for MC May Be Just Beginning, Wall
St. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at A3.
349. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
350. Scholars have attempted to solve this conundrum by articulating standards of
review for corporate boards. Wallman, supra note 131, at 172-73.
351. For a thorough discussion of the complexity inherent in this type of provision,
see Wallman, supra note 131. \Vallman is an advocate of this type of provision and, in
fact, co-drafted the first corporate constituency statute enacted in 1983, as well as the
Pennsylvania corporate law amendments reaffirming the corporate constituency con-
cept. Id at 163, n.**. Although Wallman supports other constituency provisions, he
acknowledges that shareholder interests are subordinated from their previous status
and that there is some confusion regarding the director's duty. Id. at 10.
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Conrail management sided with CSX, shareholders clearly preferred
Norfolk's bid. With respect to the Pennsylvania economy, it was im-
possible to determine which suitor would have more positively im-
pacted the community. Yet because of Pennsylvania's complex
legislation, both companies claimed the moral high ground.
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania provisions inadvertently succeeded in slowing
down the merger process and bringing all relevant parties together.
They also provided Conrail shareholders with a final share price far
beyond expectation. On the other hand, Conrail was ultimately ac-
quired, at least in part, by a foreign hostile bidder and, subsequent to
the acquisition, will be broken up by CSX and Norfolk. This was what
the anti-takeover legislation was intended to prevent.
The Conrail saga suggests important lessons for state legislatures
under political pressure to pass comprehensive anti-takeover provi-
sions on a moment's notice. The ever-evolving face of corporate
America is not effectively governed by highly technical and complex
laws. Like the simple definition of fiduciary duty that leaves interpre-
tation to the courts, anti-takeover legislation must be simple enough
to understand and flexible enough to consistently apply to the myriad
of possible takeover situations. For this reason, state anti-takeover
provisions should be viewed with skepticism and the trend towards
increasing their scope and comprehensiveness should be reconsidered.
As Conrail illustrated, Pennsylvania's legislation was so aggressive
that, in this instance, the other constituencies provision was without
force. Ultimately, complicated anti-takeover provisions are self-de-
feating because they cannot contemplate every conceivable corporate
variation.
If state legislatures continue to support anti-takeover legislation,
they should avoid hastily-passed statutes intended to prevent a spe-
cific acquisition. Such short-sighted political aggression will have
costly effects when new unanticipated situations arise. If Penn-
sylvania's legislature had met weeks before CSX and Conrail publicly
announced their merger plans, it is probable they could have amended
the provisions to protect the merger from Norfolk's subsequent un-
friendly bid. The provisions created in the midst of the hostile
Belzberg takeover, however, were ill-suited to this new circumstance.
Had the state assembly done their homework when confronting the
Belzberg situation, Pennsylvania could have realized its goal of pro-
tecting the state economy from debilitating split-ups.
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